

EXHIBIT 7

B 10 Modified (Official Form 10) (12/11)

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK		PROOF OF CLAIM
Name of Debtor and Case Number: Residential Capital, LLC, Case No. 12-12020		
NOTE: This form should not be used to make a claim for an administrative expense (other than a claim asserted under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9)) arising after the commencement of the case. A "request" for payment of an administrative expense (other than a claim asserted under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9)) may be filed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503.		
Name of Creditor (the person or other entity to whom the debtor owes money or property): Ignacio Rodriguez		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Check this box if this claim amends a previously filed claim. Court Claim Number: 3353 (If known) Filed on: 11/9/2012 <input type="checkbox"/> Check this box if you are aware that anyone else has filed a proof of claim relating to this claim. Attach copy of statement giving particulars. 5. Amount of Claim Entitled to Priority under 11 U.S.C. §507(a). If any part of the claim falls into one of the following categories, check the box specifying the priority and state the amount. <input type="checkbox"/> Domestic support obligations under 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(1)(A) or (a)(1)(B). <input type="checkbox"/> Wages, salaries, or commissions (up to \$11,725*) earned within 180 days before the case was filed or the debtor's business ceased, whichever is earlier – 11 U.S.C. §507 (a)(4). <input type="checkbox"/> Contributions to an employee benefit plan – 11 U.S.C. §507 (a)(5). <input type="checkbox"/> Up to \$2,600* of deposits toward purchase, lease, or rental of property or services for personal, family, or household use – 11 U.S.C. §507 (a)(7). <input type="checkbox"/> Taxes or penalties owed to governmental units – 11 U.S.C. §507 (a)(8). <input type="checkbox"/> Other – Specify applicable paragraph of 11 U.S.C. §507 (a)(). Amount entitled to priority: \$ _____ * Amounts are subject to adjustment on 4/1/13 and every 3 years thereafter with respect to cases commenced on or after the date of adjustment.
Name and address where notices should be sent: Vito Torchia Brookstone Law, PC 4000 MacArthur Blvd., Suite 1110 Newport Beach, CA 92660 Telephone number: 800-946-8655 ext. 709 email: bankruptcy@brookstonelaw.com		
Name and address where payment should be sent (if different from above): Telephone number: _____ email: _____		
1. Amount of Claim as of Date Case Filed: \$ 1,300,000.00 If all or part of the claim is secured, complete item 4. If all or part of the claim is entitled to priority, complete item 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Check this box if the claim includes interest or other charges in addition to the principal amount of the claim. Attach a statement that itemizes interest or charges.		
2. Basis for Claim: Claims, including fraud related to mortgage origination (See instruction #2)		
3. Last four digits of any number by which creditor identifies debtor: _____	3a. Debtor may have scheduled account as: _____ (See instruction #3a)	3b. Uniform Claim Identifier (optional): _____ (See instruction #3b)
4. Secured Claim (See instruction #4) Check the appropriate box if the claim is secured by a lien on property or a right of setoff, attach required redacted documents, and provide the requested information. Nature of property or right of setoff: <input type="checkbox"/> Real Estate <input type="checkbox"/> Motor Vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> Other Describe: Value of Property: \$ _____ Annual Interest Rate _____ % <input type="checkbox"/> Fixed <input type="checkbox"/> Variable (when case was filed) Amount of arrearage and other charges, as of the time case was filed, included in secured claim, if any: \$ _____ Basis for perfection: _____ Amount of Secured Claim: \$ _____ Amount Unsecured: \$ _____		
6. Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9): Indicate the amount of your claim arising from the value of any goods received by the Debtor within 20 days before May 14, 2012, the date of commencement of the above case, in which the goods have been sold to the Debtor in the ordinary course of such Debtor's business. Attach documentation supporting such claim. \$ _____ (See instruction #6)		
7. Credits. The amount of all payments on this claim has been credited for the purpose of making this proof of claim. (See instruction #7)		
8. Documents: Attached are redacted copies of any documents that support the claim, such as promissory notes, purchase orders, invoices, itemized statements of running accounts, contracts, judgments, mortgages, and security agreements. If the claim is secured, box 4 has been completed, and redacted copies of documents providing evidence of perfection of a security interest are attached. (See instruction #8, and the definition of "redacted".) DO NOT SEND ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS. ATTACHED DOCUMENTS MAY BE DESTROYED AFTER SCANNING. If the documents are not available, please explain: _____		
9. Signature: (See instruction #9) Check the appropriate box. <input type="checkbox"/> I am the creditor. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> I am the creditor's authorized agent. <input type="checkbox"/> I am the trustee, or the debtor, or their authorized agent. <input type="checkbox"/> I am a guarantor, surety, indorser, or other codebtor. (Attach copy of power of attorney, if any.) (See Bankruptcy Rule 3004.) (See Bankruptcy Rule 3005.) I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this claim is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and reasonable belief. Print Name: Vito Torchia Title: Managing Attorney Company: Brookstone Law, PC Address and telephone number (if different from notice address above): _____ <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 40%;"> Telephone number: _____ Email: _____ </div> <div style="width: 40%; text-align: center;"> (Signature) </div> <div style="width: 20%; text-align: center;"> 8/8/2013 (Date) </div> </div>		

Penalty for presenting fraudulent claim: Fine of up to \$500,000 or imprisonment for up to 5 years, or both. 18 U.



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Plaintiff filed the initial complaint on May 9, 2012, and the first amended complaint on October 31, 2012. The case was dismissed on January 31, 2013. An initial proof of claim was filed on November 9, 2012.

Plaintiffs are submitting with this amended proof of claim as evidence an Amended Complaint in Support of the Amended Proof of Claim. In the interest of judicial economy, this summary incorporates by reference the Amended Complaint in Support of the Amended Proof of Claim that is attached to the amended proof of claim filed by Claimant Carolyn Hairston, Claim Number 3524. Ms. Hairston is a plaintiff along with this Plaintiff, and this Plaintiff joins her in the complaint.

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

CAROLYN HAIRSTON, an individual;
CHRISTINE PETERSEN, an individual;
WILLIAM MIMIAGA, an individual;
ROBIN GASTON, an individual;
PATRICK GASTON, an individual;
MARY SERRANO, an individual; SARAH
SEBAGH, an individual;
RICK ALBRITTON, an individual;
DEBORAH ALBRITTON, an individual;
VERONICA GREY, an individual;
BRENDA MELLA, an individual;
JOSELITO MELLA, an individual;
MICHAEL MAN, an individual; JUDY
LIM, , an individual; DAVID CRUZ, an
individual; YESENIA CRUZ, an
individual; GREGORY BUCK, an
individual;
CRISTINA PALBICKE, an individual;
KHALIL SUBAT, an individual;
MANIJA SUBAT, an individual;
GENEVIE CABANG, an individual;
JULIO GONZALEZ, an individual; LISA
SIMONYI, an individual; RICK EWALD,
an individual; REGINA FAISON, an
individual; ALEX IBARRA, an individual;
MARIA ELENA DEL CID, an individual;
JULIO DEL CID, an individual; MESBEL
MOHAMOUD, an individual;
MICHAEL MOULTRIE, an individual;

Case No.:

**AMENDED COMPLAINT IN SUPPORT OF
AMENDED PROOF OF CLAIM:**

**1. INTENTIONAL PLACEMENT OF
BORROWERS INTO DANGEROUS LOANS
THEY COULD NOT AFFORD THROUGH
COORDINATED DECEPTION, IN THE NAME
OF MAXIMIZING LOAN VOLUME AND THUS
PROFIT**

COUNT 1- FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT

**COUNT 2- INTENTIONAL
MISREPRESENTATION**

COUNT 3- NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION

COUNT 4- NEGLIGENCE

**COUNT 5- UNFAIR, UNLAWFUL, AND
FRAUDULENT BUSINESS PRACTICES
(VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§17200)**

2. INDIVIDUAL APPRAISAL INFLATION

**COUNT 6- INTENTIONAL
MISREPRESENTATION**

COUNT 7- NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION

COUNT 8- NEGLIGENCE

**COUNT 9- UNFAIR, UNLAWFUL, AND
FRAUDULENT BUSINESS PRACTICES
(VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§17200)**

1 WILLIE GILMORE, an individual;
2 PHYLLIS MCCREA, an individual;
3 CECILIA CHAUBE, an individual;
4 MAGDALENA AVILA, an individual;
5 GRICELDA RUANO, an individual;
6 ELISA JORDAN, an individual; LOIS
7 TERRELL SULLIVAN, an individual;
8 GLORIA PORTILLO, an individual;
9 FLORASTENE HOLDEN, an individual;
10 MARCO BADILLA, an individual;
11 MANUELA BADILLA, an individual;
12 IGNACIO RODRIGUEZ, an individual;
13 ROSA RODRIGUEZ, an individual;
14 SALVADOR BARAJAS, an individual;
15 MARIA BARAJAS, an individual; BRIAN
16 FOOTE, an individual; OLAN ROSS, an
17 individual; EVELYN ROSS, an individual;
18 GARY JOHNSON, an individual;
19 JOELLYN JOHNSON, an individual;
20 RODELINA SANTOS, an individual; JUN
21 O. SANTOS, an individual; MICHAEL
22 BROWN, an individual; CLAUDINETTE
23 BROWN, an individual; MARTIN
24 KASSOWITZ, an individual; SHIRLEY
25 KAPLAN, an individual;
26 HENRY COMPLETO, an individual;
27 IRMA Laredo, an individual; MARCIA
28 WILLOUGHBY, an individual; VICTOR
PAZOS, an individual.

Plaintiffs,

vs.

ALLY BANK, N.A., f/k/a GMAC BANK,
a Utah Corporation, in its own capacity and
as an acquirer of certain assets and
liabilities of GMAC; GMAC, a National
Banking Association; ALLY FINANCIAL,
INC. f/k/a/ GMAC, LLC, a Delaware
Corporation; GMAC MORTGAGE
GROUP, INC., A Delaware Corporation;
RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL, LLC f/k/a
RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL
CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation;
GMAC-RFC HOLDING COMPANY,

3. MARKET FIXING

COUNT 10 – FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT

COUNT 11 – NEGLIGENCE

COUNT 12- PRICE FIXING - VIOLATION OF
SHERMAN ACT 15 USC §1 ET SEQ.

COUNT 13- UNFAIR, UNLAWFUL, AND
FRAUDULENT BUSINESS PRACTICES
(VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§17200)

4. DECEPTION IN LOAN MODIFICATIONS

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CODE CIV. PROC. § 580B AND §726
PROHIBITING COLLECTION OF DEBT AFTER
ELECTING TO FORECLOSE

COUNT 15 – FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT

COUNT 16 – INTENTIONAL
MISREPRESENTATION

COUNT 17 – NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION

COUNT 18- RESCISSION OF CONTRACT
AND/OR RESTITUTION ON THE GROUNDS OF
FRAUD, AND/OR UNCONSCIONABILITY

COUNT 19 – BREACH OF CONTRACT

COUNT 20- VIOLATION OF THE CRIER RULE
(CAL. CIV. CODE §2994G)

COUNT 21- UNFAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES (VIOLATION OF CAL. CIV. CODE
§1788 ET SEQ)

COUNT 22- UNLAWFUL, UNFAIR &
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(VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§17200)

5. INTENTIONAL UNAUTHORIZED FORECLOSURES PURSUED IN THE NAME OF PROFIT

COUNT 23- WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE

COUNT 24- UNFAIR, UNLAWFUL, AND
FRAUDULENT BUSINESS PRACTICES
(VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§17200)

[JURY TRIAL DEMANDED]

1 LLC d/b/a/ GMAC RESIDENTIAL
2 FUNDING CORPORATION, a Delaware
3 Corporation; RESIDENTIAL FUNDING
4 COMPANY, LLC f/k/a RESIDENTIAL
5 FUNDING CORPORATION, a Delaware
6 Corporation; HOMECOMINGS
7 FINANCIAL, LLC, a Delaware
8 Corporation; EXECUTIVE TRUSTEE
9 SERVICES DBA ETS SERVICES ,LLC, a
10 Delaware limited liability company;
11 HOME CONNECTS LENDING
12 SERVICES, LLC, a Pennsylvania limited
13 liability company; MTC FINANCIAL INC.
14 d/b/a Trustee Corps, a California
15 Corporation; and Does 1 through 1000 ,
16 inclusive.

17
18 Defendants.

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1 Plaintiffs, and each of them, hereby demand a jury trial and allege as follows:
2

3 **NATURE OF ACTION**

4 1. **Glossary.** As used herein...

- 5 a. "DEFENDANTS" shall collectively refer to each and every Defendant named in this
6 action, who are alleged to have acted in coordinated conspiracy with one another.
7 b. "BANK DEFENDANTS" shall refer to all Defendants acting to originate or service loans
8 including: GMAC Bank aka Ally Bank, GMAC Mortgage, GMAC Residential Funding
9 Corporation, Residential Funding Corporation, Homecomings Financial, LLC
10 c. "ALLY DEFENDANTS" shall refer to all entities formerly owned by Ally Financial
11 Brothers Holdings. In other words the term "ALLY DEFENDANTS" shall refer to all
12 Defendants with the exception of MERS and MTC Financial Inc., d/b/a Trustee Corps.
13 d. "TRUSTEE DEFENDANTS" shall refer to Defendant Executive Trustee Services d/b/a
14 ETS Services, LLC and Defendant MTC FINANCIAL INC. d/b/a Trustee Corps,
15 collectively.
16 e. "DOT" shall act as an abbreviation for the term: Deed of Trust

17 2. This lawsuit arises from Defendants' wrongs and deception in inducing Plaintiffs to enter
18 into mortgages from 2003 through 2008 with the Bank Defendants, as well as deception in loan
19 modifications and wrongful foreclosure activities through current day.

20 3. The gravamen of Plaintiffs' Complaint is that –Defendants had ceased acting as
21 conventional money lenders and instead morphed into an enterprise engaged in systematic fraud upon its
22 borrowers. With profit as their motive, the conspiracy of Defendants set out upon a massive and
23 centrally-directed fraud by which Defendants (1) placed the Plaintiff-homeowners into loans which
24 Defendants *knew* Plaintiffs could not afford and would default upon to a mathematical certainty, (2)
25 abandoned industry-standard underwriting guidelines, (3) concealed/misrepresented the terms of their
26 loans to borrowers to induce their unwitting consent, and (4) intentionally inflated the appraisal values
27 of homes throughout California in a market-fixing scheme – all for the sole purpose of herding as many
28 borrowers as they could into the largest loans possible which Defendants would then sell on the

1 secondary market at inflated values for unimaginable profit (wildly surpassing the profit they would
2 make by holding the loans), *knowing that their scheme would cause the precipitous decline in values of*
3 *all homes throughout California*, including those of Plaintiffs herein.

4 4. Because Bank Defendants stood to reap so much more profit by securitizing and selling these
5 loans on the secondary market, than they would by holding their loans under the conventional “originate to
6 hold model” of traditional banking, Defendants ceased acting as conventional money lenders and instead
7 adopted the “originate to sell” model - originating loans with an eye towards (1) *immediately* selling the
8 loans on the secondary market, while (2) simultaneously becoming a servicer of the loan – both immensely
9 profitable. The result was simple. Because Defendants knew the purchasers of these loans (secondary
10 market investors) would bear all the risk in the event of default, Bank Defendants no longer had any
11 incentive to verify a borrower’s creditworthiness, or ensure that the borrower qualified for (or could afford)
12 the loans they were being given. Indeed they had an incentive to do the opposite: the sheer profit made by
13 selling high volumes of these loans.

14 5. To feed their investors and continue to make such never-before-seen profits, all of which
15 inured to the benefit of the conspiracy of Defendants, Bank Defendants needed more borrowers. In turn,
16 Bank Defendants began (1) disregarding their own as well as industry-standard underwriting standards,
17 (2) intentionally approving borrowers who they knew were grossly under-qualified, who they knew
18 could not afford their loans and who they knew would default to a mathematical certainty, (3) falsifying
19 the income and asset documentation of Plaintiff-borrowers without their consent, and (4) concealing the
20 material terms of their loans to induce a borrower’s unwitting consent - all in the name of getting as
21 many loans out the door, and sold to investors for profit, as possible. (Cause of Action for “**Intentional**
22 **Placement of Borrowers into Dangerous Loans Which They Could Not Afford**”)

23 6. Bank Defendants also ceased acting as a conventional money lender by originating loans
24 **with an eye towards immediately becoming the servicer on the loan**. Servicers earn more money
25 from initiating foreclosures and collecting various fees and thus have significantly different incentives
26 and motivations than do lenders. Knowing that they would soon become servicers, Bank Defendant
27 Banks had an (additional) incentive to place borrowers into loans they knew their borrowers could not
28 afford and to conceal highly material information regarding the loans, because as servicers they would

1 make more money by collecting fees from borrowers who couldn't afford their loans such as late fees,
2 default fees, and foreclosure fees. In other words, because Bank Defendants made more money
3 collecting fees from borrowers who couldn't afford their loans, Bank Defendants had an incentive to
4 place their borrowers into loans they couldn't afford. In doing so, Bank Defendants became anything
5 but a conventional money lender – their interests were aligned solely with those of a servicer.

6 7. Part and parcel with this scheme, the conspiracy of Defendants undertook a scheme to
7 artificially manipulate and inflate California's real estate market through their wholly-owned appraisal
8 subsidiary, Defendant Home Connects Lending Services, LLC ("HCLS") over whom Bank Defendants
9 exercised complete dominion. As is common knowledge in the real estate industry, appraisers are
10 required to calculate the value of a home based almost entirely on the value of other nearby homes
11 (called comparables aka "comps"). Defendants, including Bank Defendants seized on this vulnerability
12 in the system. Exercising dominion over their HCLS, Defendants directed HCLS to begin
13 systematically inflating the valuations they rendered upon the subject properties of each of their loans
14 (including loans of Plaintiffs herein), *knowing that by doing so* their falsely inflated valuations would
15 act as comps upon which numerous *other* appraisers based their valuations of *other* homes. These
16 inflated appraisals caused other homes to be valued for more than they were worth, which in turn acted
17 as the predicate for even higher appraisals on other homes. The result was a vicious self-feeding
18 exponential cycle, both expected and intended by Defendants - the intentional, systematic, artificial
19 inflation of home values throughout California. Because Bank Defendants had such massive market
20 share, they had the means and the ability to fully manipulate the market on a scale that few others could,
21 and indeed they did. **(The "Market Fixing Scheme Cause of Action" and separately the "Individual**
22 **Appraisal Fraud Cause of Action")**

23 8. Bank Defendants' reasons for artificially inflating the prices of real estate were simple.
24 First, by doing so Defendants created the illusion of a naturally-appreciating real economy, which
25 resulted in a purchase *and* refinance boom – which meant more loans for Defendants, and thus more
26 profit. Second, by doing so, Bank Defendants induced Plaintiffs to enter into contract with them by
27 convincing Plaintiffs that the value of their home was sufficient to justify taking out a loan of that size –
28 or in other words, to assure Plaintiffs that their collateral was sound. Third, by doing so, Bank

1 Defendants intended to induce Plaintiffs to consummate their purchase transactions by falsely reassuring
2 them that they were paying what the home was worth, and not more – the result of which was, once
3 again, more loans generated by Defendants and thus more profit. Fourth, by driving the prices of real
4 estate up, borrowers were forced to take out larger loans to afford the same property, once again
5 resulting in more profit to Bank Defendants. Fifth, then, based on these fraudulently inflated loan
6 amounts, Bank Defendants deceptively extracted excessive and unearned payments, points, fees, and
7 interest from Plaintiffs. All of these profits were shared among the conspiracy of Defendants, and inured
8 to the benefit of the Conspiracy.

9 9. The inevitable and intended result of Defendants' conspiracy was the creation of a super-
10 heated pricing bubble in the real estate economy, created by and at the direction of the conspiracy of
11 Defendants, designed to manipulate and inflate property values, and effectuated for the sole purpose of
12 lining the conspiracy of Defendant's pockets with money.

13 10. Ally and Bank Defendants and their co-conspirators conducted their scheme *knowing it*
14 *would cause the wide-spread crash of property values throughout California* and the substantial loss of
15 equity to Plaintiffs, and indeed it did. As a result of Defendants' market fixing scheme, Plaintiffs were
16 forced to pay much more for their homes, then their true uninflated worth. Even for those Plaintiffs who
17 did not purchase their property, but rather refinanced it, the demise of Defendants' scheme drove the
18 value of their property far below its original purchase price, once again resulting in the loss of
19 substantial equity.

20 11. From 2008 to the present, Californians' home values decreased by considerably more
21 than most other areas in the United States as a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' scheme set
22 forth herein.

23 12. As a result, Plaintiffs have lost their equity in their homes, if not their homes themselves,
24 their credit ratings and histories were damaged or destroyed, among a host of other damages and harms
25 which will be laid out in detail throughout this Complaint.

26 13. The profit-driven scheme/conspiracy did not end there. To further their profit, the
27 conspiracy of Defendants then intentionally steamrolled wrongful and unauthorized foreclosures upon
28 those borrowers whose very peril was caused by Defendants' fraud in the first place. They intentionally

1 initiated these wrongful foreclosures without regard to whether they had authority to foreclose, or had
2 complied with the requirements under California Law, because foreclosure is a profitable business,
3 creating profit not only for the foreclosing trustee, but also the servicing bank, as well as the owner of
4 the Deed of Trust. By initiating such unauthorized/wrongful foreclosures Bank Defendants and Trustee
5 Defendants were able to charging a host of profitable "foreclosure fees" including trustee fees, attorney
6 fees, late fees, default fees, inspection fees, among many others. (**"Intentional Wrongful Foreclosure
7 Cause of Action"**)

8 14. Further, in the face of the escalating foreclosure crisis in the United States and especially
9 in California, the Bank Defendants have further victimized and preyed on those struggling to keep by
10 offering and inducing customers into illusory "Loan Modification" or "Workout Agreements," which
11 purport to offer hope of an opportunity to cure loan default, but in truth and fact are merely a ruse
12 through which the Bank Defendants dupe homeowners into paying them thousands of dollars
13 immediately before they foreclose. On information and belief, the Bank Defendants have reaped illicit
14 profits from these actions exceeding \$100 million. (**the "Deception in Loan Modification Cause of
15 Action"**)

16 15. These activities have been the subject of intense scrutiny, enforcement actions and
17 litigation. As recently as April 13, 2011, multiple Federal regulators entered into stipulated consent
18 orders with other similarly situated banks and related entities such as MERS (described below)
19 describing massive failures and taking the first steps toward requiring Defendants and other banks to
20 refund sums to homeowners improperly foreclosed upon by Defendants and other banks.

21 16. These illusory work-out agreements were nothing more than a cash-grab designed to
22 circumvent California's prohibition against deficiency judgments. Plaintiffs are entitled to rescind and
23 obtain back from the Bank Defendants their promised (and delivered) consideration, namely the
24 payments that were made to the Bank Defendants under the Workout Agreements and Extended
25 Workout Agreements. Because California law prohibits deficiency judgments, the Bank Defendants
26 were not entitled to require post-election-to-sell payments and foreclose on the loans. In addition, such
27 payments included attorney and other fees which Plaintiffs had no obligation to pay under their
28 mortgages absent Bank Defendants' Work out Agreement Scheme

1 17. Plaintiffs are entitled to rescind and obtain back from the Bank Defendants their
2 promised (and delivered) consideration, namely the payments that were made to the Bank Defendants
3 under the illusory Workout Agreements and Extended Workout Agreements. Because California law
4 prohibits deficiency judgments, Bank Defendants were not entitled to require post-election-to-sell
5 payments and foreclose on the loans. In addition, such payments included legal and other fees which
6 Plaintiffs had no obligation to pay under their mortgages absent the Bank Defendants' Work out
7 Agreement Scheme.

8 18. Through this Action, Plaintiffs seek to stop Bank Defendants from preying on their
9 customers through its Workout Agreement Scheme. Where Bank Defendants have exercised their
10 election to sell under non-judicial foreclosure, they must not be permitted to extract thousands of dollars
11 in additional payments with illusory promises and false statements of opportunities to cure defaulted
12 loans. Bank Defendants herein have sold or initiated foreclosures on many of the Plaintiffs in this action.
13 At the very least, Plaintiffs are entitled to a return of the payments they made under the false promise
14 from Bank Defendants, that Plaintiffs would at least have an opportunity to avoid foreclosure.

15 19. This Complaint alleges in no uncertain terms that had Plaintiff known the truth of any of
16 these material facts, they would never have entered into any loans and/or modifications with Defendants.
17 If the Plaintiffs had later learned the truth, each Plaintiff would have either (1) rescinded the loan
18 transaction under applicable law and/or (2) refinanced the loan transaction with a reputable institution
19 prior to the decline in mortgage values in late 2008. Instead, each Plaintiff reasonably relied on the
20 deceptions of the Defendants in entering their loans, "trial" modification agreements (aka Workout
21 Plans), and forbearing from exercising their rights to rescind or refinance their loans.

22 20. It bears emphasizing – that this action is not about the harm and frauds that Defendants
23 have perpetrated on third-party investors, but rather the harms and frauds perpetrated upon Plaintiffs
24 herein – the borrowers. The frauds described in the Complaint upon the investor, were merely the
25 *incentive* for Defendants' fraud on Plaintiff-borrowers. The Complaint brings no action for Defendants'
26 fraud upon the investors. It only brings an action for fraud upon the borrower-Plaintiffs herein.

27 21. No business, particularly one as centrally-important to the American economy as
28 banking, should be allowed to so egregiously deceive its consumers. If Banks are to conduct business,

1 their business *must not be* that of fraud and deception.

2 **PARTIES**

3 **Plaintiffs**

4 22. All Plaintiffs listed in the above caption are competent adults and individuals residing in
5 the State of California, who borrowed money from one or more of the Defendants or its subsidiaries or
6 affiliates or successors and assigns between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2008, secured by a deed
7 of trust on his or her California real estate(s). At all material times hereto, one or more of the
8 Defendants have acted as Servicer or some other control or capacity over processing the loan.

9 23. Based on information now available to them, fewer than 100 plaintiffs are alleging claims
10 in amounts that would, as to them, equal or exceed the jurisdictional amount for federal jurisdiction
11 under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

12 24. **IN ADDITION TO THE ALLEGATIONS MADE THROUGHOUT THIS**
13 **COMPLAINT, WHICH APPLY TO ALL PLAINTIFFS (EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE**
14 **NOTED), APPENDIX "A" ("INDIVIDUALIZED PLAINTIFF ALLEGATIONS") PROVIDES**
15 **INDIVIDUALIZED ALLEGATIONS AS TO EACH AND EVERY PLAINTIFF IN THIS**
16 **ACTION AND THE SPECIFIC WRONGS DONE BY EACH DEFENDANT.** By this reference,
17 Plaintiffs hereby incorporate Appendix "A" to this Complaint.

18 25. **Statute of Limitations & Equitable Tolling** - All of the concealments, partial
19 misrepresentations and affirmative misrepresentations were unknown to all Plaintiffs referenced herein
20 at the time of loan origination. Defendants' scheme was built on deception and keeping borrowers in the
21 dark. All Plaintiffs herein discovered these frauds and concealments beginning no more than 3 years
22 prior to the date of filing this action. A reasonable person would have been unable to reasonably
23 discover said frauds any earlier. The circumstances, and date of discovery of these wrongs are alleged
24 with specificity as to each and every Plaintiff in Appendix A.

25
26 **Defendants**

27 26. Defendant Ally Bank, Inc. ("Ally Bank") is a multi-national bank that became a bank
28 holding company in December 2008. The bank is headquartered in Detroit, Michigan and incorporated

1 in the State of Utah. The bank is based at 6895 Union Park Center, Midvale, Utah, and is FDIC insured.
2 Since August 2, 2004 it operated two main offices in the United States, one in Utah and one in
3 Pennsylvania, and has 616 employees as of June 2009. It also has a Canadian operation, simply called
4 Ally which operates under Resmor Trust Company, and which is Canadian Deposit Insurance
5 Corporation insured. Ally Bank is a direct bank that markets to customers offering mortgages, savings
6 products, certificates of deposit, online savings accounts, money market accounts and interest checking
7 accounts. Back office operations for Ally Bank and Ally Financial are located in Charlotte, North
8 Carolina. Ally Bank does business in the State of California.

9 27. Defendant Ally Financial, Inc. ("Ally"), a leading, multi-national financial services firm
10 with a corporate office center in New York, has approximately \$179 billion of assets and operations in
11 approximately 25 countries. Ally is the parent and sole owner of Defendants GMAC Mortgage Group,
12 Inc. and Residential Funding Services, LLC. Prior to 2010, Ally was known as GMAC, LLC. Ally does
13 business in the State of California.

14 a. Ally's public disclosures, as reflected in its filings with the SEC, make clear that Ally
15 considers itself both a common enterprise operating as a greater whole and without
16 meaningful distinctions as to its operating units, and the successor to GMAC Mortgage,
17 Homecomings, RFC and its subsidiaries.

18 28. Defendant GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc. ("GMACM") is a wholly-owned subsidiary and
19 the mortgage arm of Ally. GMACM is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business at
20 1100 Virginia Drive, Fort Washington, Pennsylvania 19034. GMACM transacted and is continuing to
21 do business in the State of California.

22 29. Defendant Residential Capital, LLC ("ResCap") is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
23 GMACM and originates, services, and securitizes mortgage loan in the United States, including
24 California. ResCap was incorporated in the State of Delaware and its principal office is located at One
25 Meridian Crossings, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55423. Prior to 2007, ResCap was known as Residential
26 Capital Corporation. ResCap does business in the State of California.

27 30. Defendant GMAC-RFC Holding Company, LLC, doing business as GMAC Residential
28 Funding Corporation ("GMAC-RFC"), is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ResCap and acquires residential

1 mortgages and loans, which it then packages as mortgage –backed securities and sells to institutional
2 investors. GMAC-RFC was incorporated in the State of Delaware and its principal office is located at
3 8400 Normandale Lake Boulevard, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55437. GMAC-RFC transacted business in
4 California.

5 31. Defendant Residential Funding Company, LLC (“RFC”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
6 GMAC-RFC. RFC is a Delaware corporation. Prior to October 2006, RFC was known as Residential
7 Funding Corporation. RFC was known as Sponsor of Securitization transactions which involve some of
8 the Plaintiffs in this complaint. Defendant RFC is the parent and sole owner of Homecomings Financial,
9 LLC (“HFN”), the originator of loans underlying some of the Plaintiffs in this complaint. Prior to 2006,
10 HFN was known as Homecomings Financial Network, Inc. RFC does business in the State of California.

11 32. Defendant Homecomings Financial, LLC (“HFN”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of RFC.
12 HFN is a Delaware corporation and its principal office is located at 8400 Normandale Lake Boulevard,
13 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55437. Prior to October 2006, HFN was known as Homecomings Financial
14 Network, Inc. HFN is the originator of some of the Plaintiffs loans included in this complaint. HFN
15 continues to do business in the State of California.

16 33. Defendant Home Connects Lending Services, LLC (“HCLS”) is a wholly-owned
17 subsidiary of Ally. Home Connects Lending Services is a limited liability company organized and
18 existing under the laws of the state of Pennsylvania, with its principal place of business in Fort
19 Washington, Pennsylvania, and doing business in the State of California and the County of Los Angeles.
20 Home Connects Lending Services, LLC is a settlement service provider for Ally and assigns and
21 reviews all of Ally’s appraisals.

22 a. As Ally’s wholly-owned appraisal subsidiary, HCLS was a necessary and integral
23 element of Defendants’ fraud. At the direction and behest of the conspiracy of
24 Defendants, HCLS artificially inflated and manipulated values of properties throughout
25 California, including the properties of Plaintiffs, in furtherance of the wrongs described
26 throughout this Complaint, and to increase the profits inuring to the conspiracy of
27 Defendants.

28 b. The customer (Plaintiffs herein) never had a choice as to the settlement providers. Bank

1 Defendants controlled and took the choice out of the customer's hands and directed and
2 collaborated with all their partners to systematically inflate and disgorge the homeowners
3 of their freedom to choose. In furtherance of this act they used the manipulated property
4 valuations to seek premiums on their loans to Plaintiffs, and Secondary Market
5 transactions.

6 34. Defendant MTC Financial Inc., doing business as Trustee Corps ("Trustee Corps"), is a
7 California Corporation with its principal place of business in Irvine, California, and doing business in
8 the State of California. Plaintiff herein can allege with detailed factual specificity Trustee Corps's
9 involvement as an essential element of Defendants' fraud in executing foreclosures which Defendants
10 knew were wrongful and without right and intended would be unavoidable, and whose sales resulted in
11 additional profit to Defendants, in furtherance of the Defendants' conspiracy described herein.

12 35. Defendant Executive Trustee Services ("ETS") is a **wholly-owned subsidiary** of ALLY.
13 ETS was and is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of the State of
14 Delaware, with its principal place of business in Fort Washington, Pennsylvania, and doing business in
15 the State of California and the County of Los Angeles, acting as the foreclosing trustee on behalf of the
16 other Defendants named herein.

17 36. Defendants ETS and Trustee Corps (collectively "Trustee Defendants") were the vital
18 foreclosing arm of the fraudulent conspiracy of Defendants, intentionally and maliciously foreclosing on
19 Plaintiffs herein knowing they had no authority to do so, at the direction of the conspiracy, in the name
20 of profit. Further ETS and Trustee Corps intentionally and maliciously concealed the true names of
21 entities to which Plaintiffs' home loans were transferred by other Defendants. The foregoing is part of a
22 scheme by which the Defendants concealed the transferees of loans and deeds of trust, inter alia in
23 violation of California Civil Code § 2923.5 and 15 U.S.C. § 1641, as more fully described herein. ETS
24 and Trustee Corps are also independently liable as co-conspirators in the broad fraudulent conspiracy
25 among all Defendants.

26 a. Upon information and belief, ETS and Trustee Corps are acting under the direct control
27 of Ally Defendants. ETS and Trustee Corps are personally responsible for robo-signing
28 affidavits, executing assignments, and recording of Notice of Defaults and Trustee Sale

1 Notices which are defective and not in accordance to California Law.

- 2 b. This Complaint seeks significant relief from ETS and Trustee Corps given the key role
3 that they played caused many of the Plaintiffs herein to lose their homes. Through a
4 number of wrongful foreclosure actions they conspired with the other Defendants to
5 commit assorted violations of California Law. All of the violations done by this specific
6 defendant were made in the State of California against California citizens.
- 7 c. Furthermore it is alleged that ETS's and Trustee Corps' action in moving forward with
8 the foreclosure, and their actions as co-conspirators in the fraud and other harms
9 complained of herein, are done with actual malice and in bad faith – eviscerating any
10 defense of qualified trustee immunity. See *Kachlon v. Markowitz* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th
11 316, 341; *Latino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.* (E.D. Cal, Oct. 27 2011) 2011 WL 4928880
12 at *5

13 37. The true names and capacities of the Defendants listed herein as DOES 1 through 1,000
14 are unknown to Plaintiffs who therefore sue these Defendants by such fictitious names. Each of the
15 DOE Defendants was the agent of each of the other Defendants herein, named or unnamed, and thereby
16 participated in all of the wrongdoing set forth herein. On information and belief, each such Defendant is
17 responsible for the acts, events and concealment set forth herein and is sued for that reason. Upon
18 learning the true names and capacities of the DOE Defendants, Plaintiffs may amend this Complaint
19 accordingly.

20 **Relationship of Defendants**

- 21 38. Defendants herein acted pursuant to a coordinated conspiracy.
- 22 a. At all times material hereto, the business of Defendants was operated through a common
23 plan and scheme designed to effectuate the wrongs complained of herein, misrepresent
24 and/or conceal material facts set forth herein from Plaintiffs, from the California public,
25 and from regulators, either directly or as successors-in-interest to other Defendants.
- 26 b. These wrongful acts including (but not limited to) misrepresentation and concealment
27 were completed, ratified and/or confirmed by each Defendant herein directly or as a
28 successor-in-interest for another Defendant, and each Defendant performed the tortious

1 acts set forth herein for its own monetary gain and as a part of a common plan developed
2 and carried out with the other Defendants, or as a successor-in-interest to a Defendant
3 that did the foregoing.

4 c. Each Defendant herein agreed to participate in the Conspiracy, shared in the profit of the
5 conspiracy, and took tortious action in furtherance of the conspiracy.

6 d. Each of the conspirators reached a unity of purpose, common design, and meeting of the
7 minds in the unlawful arrangement and acts alleged throughout this Complaint.

8 e. "Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who,
9 although **not actually committing a tort themselves**, share with the immediate tortfeasors a
10 common plan or design in its perpetration." *Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia*
11 *Ltd.*, 7 Cal.4th 503, 510-11 (1994). "By participation in a civil conspiracy, a coconspirator
12 **effectively adopts as his or her own the torts of other coconspirators within the ambit of**
13 **the conspiracy.**" *Id.* at 511 (citing *Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co.*, 24 Cal.3d 773, 784 (1979).
14 "In this way, a coconspirator **incurs tort liability co-equal with the immediate tortfeasors.**"

15 *Id.* See also *Vieux v. East Bay Regional Park District*, 906 F.3d 1330, 1343 (9th Cir. 1990)

16 f. As to each and every Cause of Action and Count herein, Plaintiffs allege that such actions
17 were taken at the direction, behest, knowledge, and in furtherance of the conspiracy, with
18 all acts an proceeds inuring to the benefit of the members of the Conspiracy. Defendants
19 have adopted as their own, the torts of their co-conspirators all of which fell within the
20 ambit of the conspiracy alleged throughout this Complaint. Accordingly all Defendants
21 are liable for each Count and Cause of action under a theory of Conspiracy.

22 39. Plaintiffs believe and thereon allege that the agents and co-conspirators through which the
23 named Defendants operated included, without limitation, financial institutions and other firms that originated
24 loans on behalf of the Defendants. These institutions acted at the behest and direction of the Defendants, or
25 agreed to participate – knowingly or unknowingly - in the fraudulent scheme described herein.

26 40. Those firms originating loans that knowingly participated in the scheme are jointly and
27 severally liable with the Defendants for their acts in devising, directing, knowingly benefitting from and
28 ratifying the wrongful acts of the knowing participants. Upon learning the true name of such knowing

1 participants, Plaintiffs may seek leave to amend this Complaint to identify such knowing participants as
2 Doe Defendants.

3 41. For avoidance of doubt, such knowing participants include, without limitation, legal and
4 natural persons owned in whole or in part by the Defendants or affiliates thereof; legal and natural
5 persons owning directly or through affiliates financial interests in Defendants; legal and natural persons
6 directly or through affiliates acting pursuant to agreements, understandings and arrangements to share in
7 the benefits of the wrongdoing alleged in this Complaint and knowingly, to at least some degree,
8 committing acts and omissions in support thereof; and legal and natural persons knowingly, to at least
9 some degree, acting in concert with the Defendants.

10 42. As to those legal and natural persons acting in concert without an express legal
11 relationship with Defendants or their affiliates, on information and belief, Defendants knowingly
12 induced and encouraged the parallel acts and omissions, created circumstances permitting and
13 authorizing the parallel acts and omissions, benefited therefrom and ratified the improper behavior,
14 becoming jointly and severally liable therefore.

15 43. As to those legal and natural persons whose acts and omissions in support of the
16 Defendants scheme were unwitting, on information and belief, Defendants knowingly induced and
17 encouraged the acts and omissions, created circumstances permitting and authorizing the parallel acts
18 and omissions, benefited therefrom and ratified the improper behavior, becoming liable therefore.

19 44. To the extent that certain Plaintiffs herein become aware of information that provides a
20 basis for asserting the Defendants herein are liable for the origination of their loans, those Plaintiffs
21 reserve the right to seek leave of this Court to re-assert the appropriate claims herein. Plaintiffs are
22 informed and believe, and thereon allege, that: (1) the Defendants are liable for all wrongful acts of the
23 companies which Defendants acquired prior to the date thereof as the successor-in-interest to those
24 companies; (2) Ally Defendants directly and through its subsidiaries and other agents sued herein as
25 Does have continued the unlawful practices of the acquired companies since the dates of their
26 acquisition, including, without limitation thereof, writing fraudulent mortgages as set forth above and
27 concealing wrongful acts that occurred in whole or in part prior thereto, and (3) Ally Defendants and its
28 subsidiaries are jointly and severally liable as alter egos and as a single, greater unified whole.

1 45. Ally's public disclosures, as reflected in its filings with the SEC, make clear that Ally
2 considers itself both a common enterprise operating as a greater whole and without meaningful
3 distinctions as to its operating units.

4 46. The other Defendants followed Ally's directions because they are or were either
5 subsidiaries of Ally, directly or indirectly owned, controlled and dominated by Ally, or because they are
6 in an unequal economic and/or legal relationship with Ally by which they are beholden to Ally and are
7 thereby controlled and dominated by Ally.

8
9 **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:**

10 **INTENTIONAL PLACEMENT OF BORROWERS INTO DANGEROUS LOANS**
11 **THEY COULD NOT AFFORD THROUGH COORDINATED DECEPTION, IN**
12 **THE NAME OF MAXIMIZING LOAN VOLUME AND THUS PROFIT**

13 *(By All Plaintiffs against Ally and Bank Defendants, and all other Defendants as Co-Conspirators)*
14

15 47. During the 1980s and 1990s, the mortgage securitization business grew rapidly, making it
16 possible for mortgage originators to make more loans than would have been possible using only the
17 traditional primary source of funds from deposits. During that period, Bank Defendants made loans in
18 accordance with its stated underwriting and appraisal standards.

19 48. Under the traditional mortgage model, which Ally and Bank Defendants originally
20 subscribed to, a mortgage originator originated loans to borrowers, *held* the loans to maturity, and
21 therefore retained the credit default risk. As such, under the traditional model, the mortgage originator
22 had a financial incentive to ensure that (i) the borrowers had the financial ability to repay the loans, and
23 (ii) the underlying properties had sufficient value to enable the mortgage originator to recover its
24 principal and interest if the borrowers defaulted on the loans.

25 49. Traditionally, mortgage lenders financed their mortgage business primarily using funds
26 from depositors, retained ownership of the mortgage loans they originated, and received a direct benefit
27 from the income flowing from the mortgages. When a lender held a mortgage through the term of the
28 loan, it received revenue from the borrower's payments of interest and fees, and also bore the risk of loss

1 if the borrower defaulted and the value of collateral was not sufficient to repay the loan. As a result of
2 this “**originate to hold**” model, the lender had an economic incentive to verify the borrower’s
3 creditworthiness through prudent underwriting and to obtain an accurate appraisal of the value of the
4 underlying property before issuing the mortgage loan.

5 50. With the advent of securitization, the traditional “originate to hold” model gave way to
6 the “originate to sell” model, in which mortgage originators sold the mortgages and transferred credit
7 risk to their investors through the issuance and sale of Mortgage Backed Securities. Securitization
8 concurrently provided lenders like Bank Defendants with an incentive to increase the number of
9 mortgages they issued and reduced their incentive to ensure the mortgages’ credit quality.

10 51. With the aforementioned mandate for growth as the backdrop and incentive for their
11 fraud, Bank Defendants abandoned the traditional model of “**originate to hold**” and instead adopted the
12 much more lucrative “**originate to sell**” model, and in the early 2000’s Bank Defendants began to
13 systematically disregard its stated underwriting guidelines in an effort to originate an unprecedented
14 number of loans for securitization.

15 52. But to feed its investors and continue to make such never-before-seen profits, Defendants
16 needed more borrowers. In turn, Ally and Bank Defendants began disregarding their own underwriting
17 standards, and approving borrowers who were grossly under-qualified, in the name of getting as many
18 loans out the door, and sold to investors for a profit, as possible.

19 53. In fact they *preferred* under qualified borrowers. Because Ally and Bank Defendants had
20 taken out insurance policies against the possibility of default, Ally and Bank Defendants and its co-
21 conspirators (Defendants herein) would get paid in the event of a borrower’s default. In fact, in many
22 cases, Defendants had taken out numerous redundant insurance policies on the same property, so that
23 when default occurred, Defendants were getting paid out multiple times – they weren’t just breaking
24 even, they were *actually turning a profit* when borrowers defaulted. In other words, Ally and Bank
25 Defendants had an *incentive* to place borrowers into impossible loans, because by doing so they made
26 profit.

27 54. With profit as their motive, Ally and Bank Defendants, in conspiracy with the other
28 Defendants herein, set out upon a massive and centrally directed fraud by which Bank Defendants placed

1 homeowners into loans which Defendants *knew* Plaintiffs could not afford, abandoned industry standard
2 underwriting guidelines, and intentionally inflated the appraisal values of homes throughout California for
3 the sole purpose of herding as many borrowers as they could into the largest loans possible which Ally and
4 Bank Defendants would then sell on the secondary market at inflated values for unimaginable, ill-gotten
5 profit (wildly surpassing the profit they would make by holding the loans), *knowing that their scheme would*
6 *cause the precipitous decline in values of all homes throughout California*, including those of Plaintiffs
7 herein.

8 55. To be clear, it is alleged that Ally and Bank Defendants' actions in intentionally placing
9 borrowers into impossible loans in the pursuit of profit, were a substantial factor in if not *the* cause of
10 the generalized market crash which caused the prices of real estate values throughout California to
11 plummet, damaging Plaintiffs herein.

12 56. Like cattle, Plaintiff-borrowers were led to slaughter by Defendants and their greed.
13 Borrowers were intentionally placed in loans which Defendants knew Plaintiffs could not afford, and
14 whose default they knew was a mathematical certainty.

15 57. To achieve this loan volume, Bank Defendants (acting in furtherance of the conspiracy of
16 Defendants), intentionally concealed and misrepresented numerous material terms of their loans, to
17 induce Plaintiffs' unwitting, uninformed consent to those loans-- for instance going to extraordinary
18 lengths to conceal the true negatively amortizing nature of the loan, or in other instances affirmatively
19 misrepresenting that the true payment of a loan, among numerous other deceptions described below.

20 58. To further increase their loan volume and maximize their profit, Defendants intentionally
21 abandoned industry standard-underwriting guidelines (as well as their own underwriting guidelines) in
22 order to approve borrowers for loans which Bank Defendants knew were dangerous for them.

23
24 **Defendants Systematically Abused and Abandoned Industry Standard Underwriting Guidelines to**
25 **Intentionally Place Unqualified Borrowers into Loans Which Defendants Knew They Could Never**
26 **Afford**

27 59. As mentioned above, however, Defendants' fraud was multipronged. To feed their
28 investors and continue to make such never-before-seen profits, Bank Defendants needed more

1 borrowers. In turn, Bank Defendants systematically and intentionally began disregarding their own
2 underwriting standards, and approving borrowers who were grossly under-qualified, in the name of
3 getting as many loans out the door, and sold to investors for a profit, as possible.

4 60. In other words, not only did Bank Defendants inflate appraisal values, hand-in-hand with
5 HCLS, in the name of making the loans appear safer to investors, and thus more profitable to the banks
6 (discussed below in the causes of action for “Individual Appraisal Inflation” and “Market Fixing”), but
7 Bank Defendants also abandoned their own underwriting guidelines to approve more and more
8 borrowers for loans. In doing so, Defendants intentionally placed borrowers into dangerous loans which
9 would imperil their entire livelihoods, and often cases into loans whose default was an absolute
10 mathematical certainty. The result was, once again, more profit obtained through deception.

11 61. To achieve their fraud, Bank Defendants intentionally and grossly falsified Plaintiffs’
12 salary, income, bank accounts, liquid assets, non-liquid assets, employment, real estate owned values,
13 rental income ad infinitum, and by doing so simultaneously achieved two goals. First, they were able to
14 approve borrowers who could never have been approved under their own published conventional
15 underwriting guidelines (as well as industry standard underwriting guidelines used throughout the
16 United States.) Second, they were able to conceal from the investor the highly risk nature of the loan,
17 which resulted in more profit to the Bank. Investors were willing to pay more money for less risky loans.
18 The translation is that Defendants had every incentive to deceive borrowers into entering loans which
19 they realistically could never afford. The result was that Defendants turned profit, *at the sole expense of*
20 *their borrowers*. When the music stopped, only the borrowers were left without a chair.

21 62. Bank Defendants’ long-term campaign of misrepresentations, concealments and
22 abandonment of industry standard underwriting guidelines – all of which were designed to maximize loan
23 volume by placing as many borrowers into loans as possible, whether qualified or unqualified – was
24 implemented by the Board, Management and Ownership of the Ally Defendants and Bank Defendants
25 pursuant to a **top-down policy**. Ally and Bank Defendants intentionally put mechanisms and programs in
26 place to allow their own employee’s/Loan Consultants/Loan Representatives to **falsify** borrower income,
27 asset and other material information of their borrowers, without a borrower ever knowing that their income
28 or assets had been inflated. One such program was called the “**Stated Income**” program. Under this

1 program, Defendant would take as true any income stated on the application, without requesting any
2 documentation in support. Seizing this unbridled free-for-all, Defendants' **own** employees who were paid
3 commission based on the number and size of loans they got approved, rampantly falsified material income
4 and asset information of their borrowers. By doing so they were paid more commission. But more
5 importantly, Bank Defendant themselves created more products to be sold on the secondary market for
6 even more profit. In other words, Ally and Bank Defendants intentionally put policies and programs into
7 motion which would allow it to place unqualified borrowers into dangerous loans – all while maintaining
8 the semblance of propriety, and all without ever having to disclose to their investors that the incomes listed
9 on their loan applications were false.

10 63. Numerous others similar programs were also adopted such as **“stated assets”**, and **“low**
11 **documentation loans”**. Both of which allowed Bank Defendants to falsify information, and get loans
12 approved which would never been approved under traditional documentation

13 64. Even in the absence of these programs Bank Defendants and their employees
14 nevertheless had the ability to and did, falsify their borrower's income and assets through numerous
15 other means. For example, Defendants would inflate a borrower's income by making it appear as though
16 the borrower was earning rental income on of their other properties when in fact they were earning none.
17 To legitimize this false income, Defendants would add insult to injury by manufacturing an entirely
18 false rental agreement, showing the false monthly rental income, complete with the forged signature of a
19 non-existent renter.

20 65. Defendants *regularly* inflated borrowers' incomes by over 50% and on many occasions
21 by as much as a mind-numbing 500%.

22 66. Defendants were intentionally turning a blind-eye to the rampant and egregious
23 manipulations of incomes by their own employees, through policies and programs intentionally set forth
24 by Defendants' very own top executives to achieve *just such a result*. The result was that Bank
25 Defendants were able to originate loans which they knew were false, and they intended to be false, but
26 without ever having to *admit* to their secondary market investors that the loans were, in fact, false.

27 67. Ally and Bank Defendants knew and intended that their employees would falsify this
28 information, for the very reasons set forth above, and in fact incentivized them through their commission

1 and reward structure to do so. In other words Ally and Bank Defendants intended that this program
2 would be abused. And by doing so, allowed and intended for their borrowers to be placed into loans
3 which the borrowers had no chance of being able to afford had their true income/asset information been
4 used .

5 68. Defendants then told their borrowers, and Plaintiffs herein, that a determination by the
6 Bank that they were “*qualified*” for a loan meant that the borrowers would be able to “*afford*” their loan.

7 69. Industry Standard and Conventional Underwriting guidelines, including those used by
8 Bank Defendants herein, required that loans with a “front end” debt to income ratio higher than 35% be
9 rejected. They also required that loans with a “back end” debt to income ratio of higher than 45% be
10 rejected – and that 45% figure was on the on the *very* high end. For a loan with a 45% “back end” debt
11 to income ratio to be approved, a borrower had to have excellent credentials in all other areas such as
12 720+ median credit score and high liquid asset reserves totaling more than 12 months of their mortgage
13 payment.

14 70. However, Bank Defendants in this action regularly approved loans with front end ratios
15 wildly exceeding 35% (and back end ratios wildly exceeding 45%) on a regular basis, and as a matter of
16 course, in violation of their own published underwriting guidelines as well industry standard
17 underwriting guidelines used throughout the banking industry. Defendant Banks intentionally placed
18 borrowers into these dangerous loans, which fall wildly outside of their own underwriting guidelines –
19 and intentionally did so in the name of profit without any regard for a borrower’s safety. Then, to
20 ensure that these wrongs and deceptions went unnoticed Defendants embarked on a campaign of
21 concealments and misrepresentations all of which were designed to conceal the true nature and
22 payments of the loan and designed induce the borrower’s belief that they could “afford” the loan.

23
24 **Defendants Turned Substantial Profits Through Their Borrowers’ Default Furthering Their**
25 **Incentive to Intentionally Place Plaintiffs Into Impossible and Unaffordable Loans**

26 71. Not only did Ally and Bank Defendants approve under qualified borrowers – they
27 preferred them. That’s because a defaulting borrower meant profit for the conspiracy of Defendants.

28 72. All of the Defendants managed risk through leverage and derivatives trading. With the

1 advent of "Credit Default Swaps" ("CDS"), an insurance policy of sorts, they had the protection they
2 needed to push these loans out the door to grossly under qualified borrowers, without any fear of loss
3 whatsoever. The CDS gave defendants *another* incentive to give grossly under qualified borrowers –
4 whose default was virtually certain. Not only (1) were Defendants incentivized to give loans to
5 unqualified borrowers because they were turning other-worldly profit by selling as many loans on the
6 secondary market as possible, *but also* ... (see next paragraph).

7 73. (2) Because Defendants had taken out these insurance policies – aka Credit Default
8 Swaps - against the possibility of default, Ally and its co-conspirators (Defendants herein) would get
9 paid in the event of a borrower's default. In fact, in many cases, Defendants had taken out numerous
10 redundant Credit Default Swaps and insurance policies out on the same property, so that when default
11 occurred, Defendants were getting paid out multiple times – they weren't just breaking even, they were
12 *actually turning a profit* when borrowers defaulted. In other words, Ally and Bank Defendants had an
13 *incentive* to place borrowers into impossible loans, because by doing so they were making money.

14 74. This technique gave these Defendants the insurance they needed to pass the risk along to
15 third party without taking the risk themselves. Since they planned on securitizing all of their loans and
16 not keeping any of them, Ally and Bank Defendants could not care less about quality or who they hurt.
17 They would push insurance on the investors and actually over insure the loan pools, at times betting that
18 the Plaintiffs and other borrowers would default.

19 75. Since the Defendants created these pools to begin with, they were fully aware of the lack
20 of quality and lack of due diligence that went into setting up these pools. These "swaps" are life
21 insurance policies that are placed on Plaintiffs' loans. If the loan dies, the Defendants get paid.

22 76. But insurance against default wasn't the only way Defendants made money from the
23 losses of their imperiled borrowers. Bank Defendants and Trustee Defendants also made money by
24 charging a litany of unearned and egregiously marked up fees associated with the initiation of and
25 conducting (their own wrongful) foreclosures including: inspection fees, default fees, late fees, advance
26 fees, attorney's fees, and trustee fees. In short Bank Defendants had an incentive *to place Plaintiff*
27 *borrowers into loans they knew their borrowers could not afford* because by doing so, Bank Defendants
28 and Trustee Defendants would turn a profit. Not only that, but Defendants had an incentive *to*

1 *wrongfully initiate foreclosures* because they made money by doing so through the assessment of
2 excessive, disproportionate and unearned fees. This topic is further developed in the Cause of Action for
3 Wrongful Foreclosure (discussed below).

4
5 **Defendants Intentionally Misrepresented, Partially Misrepresented, & Concealed Highly Material**
6 **Information In Order To Induce Plaintiffs to Unknowingly Take Dangerous Loans So that**
7 **Defendants Could Profit**

8 77. To maximize their profit, Defendants needed loan volume. In turn, Bank Defendants
9 (acting in furtherance of the conspiracy of Defendants), intentionally concealed and misrepresented
10 numerous material terms of their loans, to induce Plaintiffs' unwitting, uninformed consent to those
11 loans, in order to get as many borrowers into loans as possible – for instance going to extraordinary
12 lengths to conceal the true negatively amortizing nature of the loan, or in other instances affirmatively
13 misrepresenting the true payment and terms of a loan, among numerous other deceptions described
14 below.

15 78. To further their fraud, Ally and Bank Defendants, acting at the behest of the Conspiracy
16 of Defendants, operated with the primary imperative of keeping Plaintiffs in the dark about the truth of
17 their scheme and the terms of the loans because Defendants knew that if Plaintiffs knew the truth,
18 Plaintiffs would never have entered into the loans with Bank Defendants.

19 79. To that end, Ally and Bank Defendants embarked on a long term campaign of
20 misinformation, including intentional misrepresentations, partial misrepresentations & half-truths
21 calculated to deceive, as well as active suppression of material facts, all in aims of inducing Plaintiffs to
22 enter into a loan contract with Defendant which they would not have otherwise.

23 80. Defendants, hand-in-hand with one another, **actively concealed** the following highly
24 material items of information:

- 25 a. The fact that Bank Defendants had intentionally abandoned their own as well as
26 industry standard underwriting guidelines *for the purpose of* placing borrowers into loans
27 which they knew borrowers could not afford and upon which they knew borrowers would
28 default to a mathematical certainty;

- 1 b. That Bank Defendants had abandoned the “originate to hold” business model of
2 conventional money lenders, and instead became **a loan packaging and re-selling**
3 **facility in which Bank Defendants originated loans for the sole purpose of reselling**
4 **them on the secondary market for vast profit** –creating an incentive to place borrowers
5 into loans which bank defendants knew they could not afford and simultaneously passing
6 along all risk of default to the purchasers of the loan.
- 7 c. That Bank Defendants had falsified Plaintiffs’ income and asset documentation to
8 intentionally place them into loans they could not otherwise afford;
- 9 d. That Bank Defendants internally knew the products they were selling were dangerous and
10 referred to them, among other things as “sacks of shit” as established by numerous
11 internal emails;
- 12 e. That Bank Defendants possessed internal reports concluding that if a Plaintiff took a loan
13 from Defendants, that Plaintiff would suffer material losses, including but not limited to
14 the loss of substantial equity;
- 15 f. That Bank Defendants knew their scheme would cause a liquidity crisis that would
16 devastate home prices;
- 17 g. That Bank Defendants were no longer making loans based on a borrower’s qualifications
18 or their ability to afford such a loan and that those ideas were now unimportant to them,
19 but were instead making loans without regard for a borrowers qualifications or ability to
20 afford simply to create sufficient product to sell to investors on the secondary market for
21 profit;
- 22 h. That Bank Defendants *knew* Plaintiff-borrowers could not afford the loans they were
23 being placed into and which they knew Plaintiffs would default upon to a mathematical
24 *certainty*, but intentionally placed them into these impossible loans nonetheless in the
25 name of making profit;
- 26 i. That Bank Defendants actively concealed the material terms of their loans from their
27 borrowers, including but not limited to the fact a borrower was *certain* to defer interest
28 under an Option ARM loan by making the minimum payment

- 1 j. That Defendants were no longer making loans based upon the profitability of their
2 mortgage lending business (but rather instead upon the profitability of sales of these loans
3 to investors and secondary markets);
- 4 k. That Because of this profitable scheme and because their loans were insured, Defendants
5 stood to profit regardless of whether their loans performed and as such had no incentive
6 to insure that the loans they were placing their borrowers into were safe, or that their
7 borrowers were actually qualified for (or could make payments on) the loans into which
8 they were being placed – in fact they had a disincentive to do so;
- 9 l. That Bank Defendants were in fact dependent on selling loans it originated into the
10 secondary mortgage market, to sustain its business;
- 11 m. That Bank Defendants were making loans simply to create sufficient product to sell to
12 investors for profit;
- 13 n. That Bank Defendants had ceased acting as conventional money lenders and had, instead,
14 morphed into an enterprise engaged in systematic fraud on all of its material
15 constituencies, including Plaintiffs;
- 16 o. That Bank Defendants had ceased acting as conventional money lenders who carried their
17 own risk and turned profit through the production of low-risk loans, and instead morphed
18 into a loan conveyor belt, packaging loans with little if any regard for their underwriting
19 standards, and selling those loans at substantial profit to investors on the secondary
20 market to whom the risk would be passed on, through fraud and misrepresentation – a
21 business enterprise vastly more profitable than the business model of being a
22 conventional money lender;
- 23 p. That in furtherance of this scheme, Bank Defendants had in fact abandoned their
24 conventional lending business and prudent lending standards, consistently lending to
25 those who were grossly under-qualified and who they knew could not afford their loans
26 and would default upon to a mathematical certainty;
- 27 q. Bank Defendants knew these loans were unsustainable for themselves and the borrowers
28 and to a certainty would result in a crash that would destroy the equity invested by

1 Plaintiffs and other of Defendants' borrowers;

2 r. Bank Defendants, their officers and employees internally referred to these loans as
3 "Sacks of Shit" and "Garbage Loans";

4 s. Bank Defendants knew the sheer scope of their loan portfolio and fraudulent packaging
5 of the portfolio would cause a liquidity crisis that would devastate home prices and
6 gravely damage Plaintiffs;

7 t. Bank Defendants knew Plaintiffs would be materially and substantially harmed by
8 contracting with Defendants;

9 u. Bank Defendants pursuit of a matching strategy in which it matched the terms of any loan
10 being offered in the market, even loans offered by primarily subprime originators
11 dangerously placed borrowers into loans regardless of whether or not they were actually
12 qualified for the loan or could actually afford the loan, instead ceding their underwriting
13 guidelines to whoever was the most lax lender at the time, regardless of whether or not
14 *that* lenders guidelines were proper, safe, negligent or even dangerous or guided by
15 reason;

16 v. The high percentage of loans it originated that were outside its own already widened
17 underwriting guidelines due to loans made as exceptions to guidelines;

18 w. Bank Defendants definition of "prime" loans included loans made to borrowers with
19 FICO scores well below any industry standard definition of prime credit quality;

20 x. The high percentage of Bank Defendants subprime originations that had a loan to value
21 ratio of 100%; and

22 y. Bank Defendants subprime loans had significant additional risk factors, beyond the
23 subprime credit history of the borrower, associated with increased default rates, including
24 reduced documentation, stated income, piggyback second liens, and LTVs in excess of
25 95%.

26 81. The Plaintiffs did not know any of the concealed facts. Defendants had exclusive
27 knowledge of these facts.

28 82. Ally and Bank Defendants, at the benefit of the Conspiracy of Defendants, further stated

1 and asset documentation as well as abandoned their own underwriting guidelines);

- 2 f. Representations to a borrower that his payment would cover both principal and interest,
3 and calculated to induce the borrower to believe that his or her payment would always
4 cover principal and interest, when in reality that same payment would no longer cover
5 any principal after a very short period of time, and indeed would not even cover the
6 minimum interest on the loan resulting in deferred interest;
- 7 g. Representations made in the Loan Documents that by making the minimum payment of an
8 Option ARM loan, a party *may* defer interest (aka “negatively amortize”), when in *reality* by
9 making the minimum payment a party was *certain* to defer interest. **The California Court of**
10 **Appeals in *Boschma* has held that these identical allegations give rise to an actionable**
11 **claim for fraudulent concealment.**; The *Boschma* court held that where, as here, the
12 disclosures in Defendants’ Option ARM loans discussing negative amortization, only frame
13 negative amortization as a mere **possibility**, rather than the reality which is that when making
14 a minimum payment negative amortization is a **certainty**, the disclosure is insufficient under
15 law, giving rise to a valid cause of action not only for UCL but also for fraudulent
16 concealment . (*Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230.) In so
17 holding the court in *Boshcma* explicitly held that Banks have a duty to disclose such material
18 information. Plaintiffs allege that Bank Defendants, identically, failed to disclose the
19 certainty of negative amortization in the Option ARM loans. Plaintiffs have attached
20 supporting documentation. (See Appendix A).
- 21 h. The provision of an intentionally ambiguous Truth in Lending Disclosure (“TILDS”)
22 Payment Schedule which did not make it clear that borrowers could have avoided
23 negative amortization (under an Option ARM loan) by making payments larger than
24 those that were mandated by the payment schedule, in fact the payment schedule created
25 the materially false impression that by following the payment schedule, Plaintiff
26 borrowers would not negatively amortize their loan;
- 27 i. Other partial misrepresentations and half-truths calculated to induce the borrower to
28 fundamentally misunderstand the nature of their loan, such that Plaintiff-borrowers would

1 numerous half-truths and made partial representations calculated to deceive Plaintiffs and to create a
2 substantially false impression. (*Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 250*,
3 ["Defendant [bank] had a common law duty to avoid making partial, misleading representations that
4 effectively concealed material facts"]; (*Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th*
5 282, 292 ["**Even where no duty to disclose would otherwise exist**, where one **does** speak he must
6 speak the whole truth to the end that he does not conceal any facts which materially qualify those
7 stated."]). By making such partial misrepresentations, Defendants incurred a duty to speak the whole
8 truth such that Defendants do not conceal any facts which materially qualify those stated. Such **partial**
9 **misrepresentations** include:

- 10 a. Representations calculated to make a borrower believe that his or her payment would
11 only be X dollars, when in reality such payment was only available for a limited
12 undisclosed period of time and would then drastically increase;
- 13 b. Representations that a borrower could afford payments under their loan, calculated to
14 make a borrower believe that the loan payment would always be constant, but made
15 knowing that the such payments would later drastically increase and knowing that the
16 borrower would be *unable* to afford such increased payments;
- 17 c. Representations that a borrower qualified for a loan, when in reality the borrowers'
18 qualification was only obtained through Defendants falsification of the borrowers'
19 income, asset and other documentation, done without the borrower's knowledge;
- 20 d. Defendants' intentional publication and dissemination of their underwriting guidelines
21 intended to create the perception that Bank Defendants lent in conformity with those
22 guidelines and that their lending standards were safe, when in reality Defendants had
23 abandoned their underwriting guidelines and were issuing loans which they knew were in
24 unsafe;
- 25 e. Representations made that a borrower *qualified* for a loan (oftentimes based on
26 documents falsified by Defendants) calculated to induce the borrower's belief they could
27 *afford* their loan, when in reality Defendants knew borrowers would be unable to afford
28 their loan as a matter of fact (oftentimes because Defendants had falsified their income

1 agree to a loan they would not have otherwise agreed to, such as the meaning of a pre-
2 payment penalty, or whether they had a pre-payment penalty.

3 83. Ally and Bank Defendants, hand in hand with one another, **intentionally and**
4 **affirmatively misrepresented:**

- 5 a. That Plaintiffs would be able to *afford* the loans they were being given;
- 6 b. That Defendants' calculations confirmed that Plaintiffs will be able to afford the loans
7 they were being given;
- 8 c. That Defendants calculations confirmed that Plaintiffs would be able to shoulder the
9 additional debt resulting from Defendant's loans, even in light of Plaintiffs' other debts
10 and expenses;
- 11 d. That the term "qualify" was synonymous with being able to "afford" a loan.
- 12 e. That by paying the minimum payment on the Option ARM loan they would not be
13 deferring interest (aka "negatively amortizing"), when in reality, they would be deferring
14 interest;
- 15 f. That by paying the minimum payment on the Option ARM loan, Plaintiffs would be
16 paying principal and interest, when in reality the minimum payment did not pay down
17 any principal, and actually resulted in deferred interest (aka negative amortization);
- 18 g. That the value arrived at by Defendants' and HCLS' appraisals of Plaintiffs' property
19 was indeed the true value of Plaintiffs' property (when in reality Defendants appraisals'
20 were intentionally and artificially inflated, and moreover when Defendants had engaged
21 in a systematic price fixing scheme which had already falsely inflated the value of
22 Plaintiffs' property);
- 23 h. The true terms of the their loans, including their interest rate, the terms of their loans,
24 whether the loan was variable or fixed, the duration of any fixed period, and the
25 inclusion of a prepayment penalty;
- 26 i. That Defendants only entered into mortgages with qualified borrowers (when in reality
27 Defendants were recklessly and intentionally ignoring their own underwriting standards,
28 and offering mortgages to substantially under-qualified borrowers, including Plaintiffs

1 herein who they knew could not afford their loans);

- 2 j. That Defendants were financially sound (when in reality Defendants were dependent on
3 selling their fraudulently-pooled loans to investors and the secondary market to sustain
4 their business);
- 5 k. That Defendants held their loans in their own portfolio and did not sell them on the
6 secondary market (when in reality Defendants sold the overwhelming majority of their
7 loans on the secondary market);
- 8 l. That Defendants were engaged in lending of the highest caliber (when in reality
9 Defendants (1)were disregarding industry standard quality assurance and underwriting
10 guidelines as well as their own underwriting guidelines, (2)had ceded their underwriting
11 guidelines to the bottom of the market by virtue policy to match loans of any other lender
12 no matter how unsafe, and (3) were lending to under qualified borrowers upon properties
13 which were intentionally overvaluated – all in the name of making as much money on the
14 secondary/investor market as quickly as possible);
- 15 m. That the loans they offered were safe and secure (when internally Defendants and their
16 officers were referring to their loans as “SACKS OF SHIT” and “GARBAGE LOANS”);
- 17 n. That Plaintiffs and other borrowers were qualified for the loans Defendants were placing
18 them into and that Plaintiffs were capable of affording the fully amortized payments on
19 those loans (when internally Defendants knew that Plaintiffs were not qualified, that
20 Plaintiffs could not afford the loan, and that, in many instances, it was a mathematical
21 inevitability that the Plaintiffs would default);
- 22 o. That Plaintiffs would be able to refinance their loans at a later date (when internally
23 Defendants knew that Plaintiffs would not be able to refinance Plaintiffs as a result of the
24 depressed real estate market created by Defendants, the overvaluation of Plaintiffs’
25 property, the damage to Plaintiffs’ credit score which defendants knew would ensue, and
26 for the many reasons already set forth above);
- 27 p. That Defendants would modify Plaintiffs’ loans (when in fact Defendants did not modify
28 Plaintiffs’ loans, had no intentions to do so, and it was more profitable for Defendants to

1 leave the loans unmodified).

2
3 *Authority to Bind*

4 84. These representations were not made as statements of opinion, but as statements of fact,
5 made by the employees and agents of the Ally and Bank Defendants charged with the duty of
6 originating loans (“**Loan Representatives**”) and who were specifically employed by Bank Defendants
7 to walk Plaintiff borrowers through the loan process, and vested with the authority, both apparent and
8 actual, to bind Defendants.

9 85. Each and every one of these Loan Representatives was vested by the respective bank they
10 work for – the bank/lending institution from which a Plaintiff got his/her loan – with both actual and
11 apparent authority to bind that bank/lending institution. These Loan Representatives were the *primary*,
12 if not sole, interface between the bank/lending institution and the customer/borrower/plaintiff.
13 Defendant banks very much intended to create the distinct perception that the representations made by
14 these Loan Representatives, were factual representations coming directly from the bank, and
15 representations upon which the borrower Plaintiffs could reasonably rely, well above-and-beyond that of
16 mere opinion.

17 86. Specifically, with regard to the representation made by Bank Defendants to Plaintiff
18 borrowers, that they could “afford” the loans they were being given were statements delivered as
19 statements of fact upon which Plaintiffs could reasonably rely, particularly in light of the specialized
20 expertise of the Defendant employees who made the statements. These employees spend months and
21 years, undergoing specialized education, to learn the highly complicated mathematics of lending such as
22 loan amortization, loan re-casting, front end debt to income ratios, back end debt to income ratios, and
23 loan to value ratios – mathematics which borrowers simply don’t understand, nor could they be expected
24 to. Because of their vastly superior knowledge, and because of the actual and apparent authority vested
25 in these employees by the Defendant Banks, as described above, Plaintiffs herein reasonably relied on
26 these statements. By making these false and misleading statements, they incurred a duty to be truthful.
27
28

Plaintiffs Reasonably Relied on Defendants' Numerous Deceptions in Deciding to Enter into Contracts With Them

87. Defendants intended to deceive Plaintiffs and induce their reliance, by intentionally misrepresenting and failing to disclose the material facts.

88. Plaintiffs did in fact rely on each of the aforementioned misrepresentations, partial representations and concealments in deciding to contract with Defendants

89. Plaintiffs reasonably and foreseeably relied upon the deception of Defendants in deciding to enter into a Loan contract with Bank Defendants - Defendants were among the nation's leading providers of Loan. It was highly regarded and by dint of its campaign of deception through securities filings, press releases, public utterances, web sites, advertisements, brokers, loan consultants and branch offices, Bank Defendants had acquired a reputation for performance and quality underwriting.

90. Moreover, as consumers unfamiliar with the myriad intricacies, terms and mathematics of mortgages, it was both reasonable and foreseeable (if not entirely intended) that Plaintiffs would rely on the advice of loan professionals and bank representatives (many of whom held the title "Loan CONSULTANT") trained to understand the highly-complicated terms and mathematics of financing, amortization, indices, margins, and collateralization in the mortgage world, in deciding to contract with Bank Defendants. Their knowledge of this process, its details, as well as their loan products was vastly superior to those of Plaintiff borrowers. Indeed, Bank Defendants had exclusive knowledge of these material facts which were not known to Plaintiff.

91. The reality is that borrowers simply don't understand the highly complicated mathematics of lending such as amortization, loan re-casting, loan to value ratios, or debt to income ratios, etc. Nor could they be expected to – those mathematics require specialized training and education. The borrower's knowledge is inferior. Because of the vast imbalance of knowledge, when a loan consultant tells a borrower that they can afford their loan, borrowers are put in a position where they must repose their trust on their lender's knowledge.

92. Indeed, Bank Defendants induce their borrowers (Plaintiffs) to repose trust in them by holding themselves out as (1) experienced professionals with (2) superior knowledge, education and expertise, and by offering them financial guidance on how to structure their assets, equity position, and debt – all of which was held out as being for the borrower's (Plaintiffs') benefit. In many

1 instances Bank Defendants called Borrowers to **solicit loans under the guise of offering them**
2 **“financial advice” and “investment strategies.”** In so acting, Defendants acted as fiduciaries or quasi-
3 fiduciaries.

4 93. Based upon the Defendants’ (1) long term media campaign holding themselves out as a
5 trustworthy and reputable lending institution, (2) position as leading financial institutions, (3) Defendants’
6 expertise, highly specialized training, unique understanding of the highly complicated terms and
7 mathematics of financing as well as Defendant Banks’ capacity as an advisor, in addition to their (4)
8 intentionally misleading and/or partially true statements found in omissions, including in their securities
9 filings, numerous documents, advertisements and other media, statements made by their employees and
10 agents with apparent and/or actual authority and their publicly available underwriting guidelines the
11 Plaintiffs reasonably relied upon the statements and omissions made by Defendants and reasonably
12 relied that no material information necessary to their decisions would be withheld or incompletely,
13 inaccurately or otherwise improperly disclosed. In so relying, the Plaintiffs were gravely damaged as
14 described herein. The Defendants acted willfully with the intention to conceal and deceive in order to
15 benefit therefrom at the expense of the Plaintiffs.

16 94. Further, Plaintiffs had no way of knowing, among other things, that Defendants (1) were
17 secretly departing from their own stated underwriting guidelines to intentionally approve borrowers for
18 loans they couldn’t afford in aims of selling as many loans as possible on the secondary market for
19 profit, or (2) had surreptitiously manipulated the appraised values of their borrower’s properties and had
20 otherwise artificially pumped up values of real estate through California (aka “market fixing”).
21 Defendants’ knowledge of these items was exclusive. Their scheme was built on keeping borrowers in
22 the dark

23 95. Furthermore, because of a lender’s (2) vastly superior knowledge compared to that of
24 their borrowers, and because of (3) the highly-advisory role a lender takes in the lending process
25 (advising borrowers how much they can afford, what type of loan and term they should take, what size
26 loan to take, how to structure their loan, and what their payments will be), Bank Defendants
27 intentionally placed their borrowers in a position where they *must* repose trust in their lender.

28 96. In reliance on the above concealments and/or material misrepresentations, Plaintiffs

1 entered into mortgage contracts with Defendants they otherwise would not have entered into and as a
2 result thereof were damaged. This damage was not only foreseeable by Defendants, but actually
3 foreseen (and then concealed) by them.

4 97. The unraveling of Defendants' scheme has caused the material depression of real estate
5 values throughout California, including the real estate of Plaintiffs herein.

6 98. Defendants knew that within a foreseeable period, its investors would discover that
7 Defendants' borrowers could not afford their loans and the result would be foreclosures and economic
8 devastation.

9 99. Despite their awareness of and concerns about the increasing risk the Defendants were
10 undertaking, they hid these risks from the Plaintiffs, borrowers, potential borrowers, and investors.

11 100. These frauds and concealments, partial misrepresentations and affirmative
12 misrepresentations were unknown to all Plaintiffs referenced herein at the time of loan origination. All
13 Plaintiffs herein discovered these frauds and concealments beginning no more than 3 years prior to the
14 date of filing this action. A reasonable person would have been unable to reasonably discover said
15 frauds any earlier.

16 ***Bank Defendants Owed Plaintiffs a Duty***
17

18 101. For seven separate and independent reasons, Bank Defendants owed Plaintiffs a duty.

19 102. **First** under California Civil Code §1572, parties to a contract have an unequivocal duty
20 to disclose material facts to one another. (*Walker v. KFC Corp.* (S.D.Cal. 1981) 515 F.Supp. 612, 622
21 "[[section] 1572 affirmatively imposes the duty not to suppress facts on persons who are parties to a
22 contract or who are inducing others to enter into a contract.']) Here Plaintiffs are engaged in contracts
23 with respective loan contracts with each of the Bank Defendants, and plaintiffs have alleged numerous
24 failures to disclose such material facts. (See paragraph 333, and Appendix A).

25 103. **Second**, California Civil Code §§1709 and 1710 establish a separate independent duty of
26 disclosure, even in the absence of a contractual relationship, where, as here, Bank Defendants and HCLS
27 have made partial inaccurate disclosures which are likely to mislead for want of the missing fact,
28 codifying the long-standing rule that the "telling of a half-truth calculated to deceive, is fraud." Plaintiffs

1 have alleged numerous such partially misleading disclosures at paragraph 336, of this Complaint, and in
2 Appendix A. The Supreme Court of California has held the same. (Warner Constr. Corp., supra, 2
3 Cal.3d at 294 [A defendant has a duty of disclosure “when the defendant makes partial representations
4 but also suppresses some material facts.”]).

5 104. **Third**, Bank Defendants and HCLS had exclusive knowledge of numerous items of highly
6 material information which they did not disclose. Numerous cases including those from the Supreme Court
7 of California hold that a defendant has a duty of disclosure “when the defendant had exclusive knowledge
8 of material facts not known to plaintiff.” *Warner Constr. Corp.*, supra, 2 Cal.3d at 294.

9 105. **Fourth**, a Defendant has a duty to disclose “when it actively conceals a material fact
10 from the plaintiff.” *Warner Constr. Corp.*, supra, 2 Cal.3d at 294. This Complaint alleges throughout
11 that Bank Defendants and HCLS embarked on a campaign of active suppression and concealment of
12 numerous material facts.

13 106. **Fifth**, Numerous court, including the California Court of Appeal have held that where,
14 as here, the disclosures in Plaintiffs’ Option ARM loans discussing negative amortization, only frame
15 negative amortization as a mere possibility, rather than the reality which is that when making a
16 minimum payment negative amortization is a certainty, the disclosure is insufficient under law, giving
17 rise to a valid cause of action not only for UCL but also for fraud/misrepresentation. (*Boschma v. Home*
18 *Loan Center, Inc.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230.) The court in *Boshcma* explicitly held that Banks have a
19 duty to disclose such material information. Plaintiffs allege that Bank Defendants, identically, failed to
20 disclose the certainty of negative amortization in the Option ARM loans. Plaintiffs have attached
21 supporting documentation. (See Appendix A).

22 107. **Sixth**, Defendants have **ceased acting as conventional money lenders**. In conducting
23 the wrongs described above and throughout this Complaint, the Bank Defendants stepped vastly outside
24 of their role as conventional money lenders, and instead morphed into an enterprise engaged in
25 intentional fraud upon their borrowers. Among their numerous departures from the actions of a
26 conventional money lender, Defendants:

- 27 a. **Intentionally falsified the values and appraisals of each of the Plaintiffs’ subject**
28 **properties** – numerous courts have held that such falsification of appraisals “do not fall

1 within a bank's role as a traditional money lender." (*Sullivan v. JP Morgan Chase Bank*,
2 *N.A.* (E.D.Cal. 2010) 725 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1094; *Watkinson v. MortgageIT* (2010) 2010
3 WL 2196083 at *9.)

- 4 b. Artificially and fraudulently inflated the value of all of the California real estate market,
5 (as opposed to just those of Plaintiffs herein) in a **Price Fixing scheme achieved**
6 **through pervasive and coordinated falsification of appraisals**, knowing that by doing
7 so their fraudulent appraisals would act as comparables which would artificially inflate
8 the rest of the market (as detailed in the Causes of Action for "Individual Appraisal
9 Inflation" and "Market Fixing" below)
- 10 c. **Coerced their appraisers to falsify their appraisals through bribery, undue**
11 **influence, instruction, appraiser selection manipulation, financial pressure, as well**
12 **as threats – both explicit and implicit** – that if their appraisals didn't return a valuation
13 above that demanded by Bank Defendants (1) future business with the appraiser would
14 either diminish or discontinue altogether or (2) that the individual appraiser would be
15 fired/blacklisted.
- 16 d. Intentionally and knowingly subjected their appraisers to known conflicts of interest.
- 17 e. **Intentionally falsifying the income and asset documentation** of their borrowers to
18 place them into loans which Defendants knew Plaintiffs could not afford, and would
19 default upon to a mathematical certainty. Numerous courts have held banks liable for
20 fraud for such identical acts because such acts "do not fall within a bank's traditional role
21 as money lender." (*Sullivan v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.* (E.D.Cal. 2010) 725
22 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1094; *Watkinson v. MortgageIT* (2010) 2010 WL 2196083 at *9.)
- 23 f. Abandoned the "originate to hold" business model of conventional money lenders, and
24 instead became a **loan packaging and re-selling facility in which bank defendants**
25 **originated loans for the sole purpose of reselling them on the secondary market for**
26 **vast profit** –creating an incentive to place borrowers into loans which bank defendants
27 knew they could not afford and simultaneously passing along all risk of default to the
28 purchasers of the loan.

- 1 g. Intentionally abandoned industry-standard underwriting guidelines – the hallmark of
2 conventional money lending - in order to place borrowers into loans they knew they
3 could not afford solely in the name of profit;
- 4 h. **Originated loans with an eye towards immediately securitizing and re-selling them**
5 **on the secondary market and becoming the servicer on the loan**, thus creating an
6 incentive to place borrowers into loans they knew their borrowers could not afford
7 because by doing so Defendants-now-turned-servicers would be in a position to collect
8 highly-lucrative fees from their imperiled borrowers, such as late fees, default fees, and
9 indeed foreclosure fees. In doing so, Defendants became anything but conventional
10 money lenders – **their interests were directly aligned with those of a servicer**.
11 Numerous courts have held that where, as here, a bank acts as servicer they have exceed
12 their role as a conventional money lender. (*Johnson v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat. Ass'n*
13 (S.D.Cal. 2012) 2012 WL 928433 *4.)
- 14 i. **Entered into loan modifications with Plaintiffs**. A lender goes beyond its "role as a
15 silent lender and loan servicer [when it] offer[s] an opportunity to plaintiffs for loan
16 modification and to engage with them concerning the trial period plan. ... [T]his is
17 precisely beyond the domain of a usual money lender ... [and] constitutes sufficient active
18 participation to create a duty of care", as held by numerous courts. (*Garcia v. Ocwen*
19 *Loan Serv., LLC* (N.D. Cal.) 2010 WL 1881098 at *3; *Ansanelli v. JPMorgan Chase*
20 *Bank, N.A.*, No. C 10-03892 WHA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32350, at *21-22 (N.D.Cal.
21 Mar. 28, 2011; *Johnson v. HSBC Bank USA*, (S.D. Cal. 2012) 2012 WL 928433 at *3.)
- 22 j. **Engaged in massive intentional fraud upon its borrowers**. While a bank may in the
23 course of conventional lending act negligently from time to time, intentional committed
24 torts cannot be said to be conventional practice for lenders. If Bank Defendants wish to
25 assert that massive intentional fraud on their borrowers is conventional practice for
26 lenders, they should do so at trial. Numerous courts, including the Supreme Court of the
27 United States have recognized that a duty properly attaches to a bank when it acts
28 intentionally, rather than negligently. (*Connor v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Ass'n*

(1968) 69 Cal.2d 850, 865; *Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Assn.* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1089; *Becker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.* (E.D.Cal. 2011) 2011 WL 3319577; Dumas, supra, 2011 WL 4906412; *Champlaie, supra*, 706 F.Supp.2d at 1060; *Watkinson v. MortgageIT, Inc.* (S.D. Cal. 2010) 2010 WL 2196083.)

k. **Seventh**, and finally, even when acting as a conventional money lender, Banks nevertheless owe a duty to their borrowers, when they meet the following test:

In California, the test for determining whether a financial institution owes a duty of care to a borrower-client “ ‘involves the balancing of various factors, among which are [1] the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, [2] the foreseeability of harm to him, [3] the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, [4] the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, [5] the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and [6] the policy of preventing future harm.

(*Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Assn.* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1098). Each of the 6 elements is amply alleged throughout this Complaint.

108. Defendants’ profit-driven scheme to herd as many borrowers into loans at any cost through coordinate deception was implemented pursuant to a top down policy ratified at the highest levels of each of Bank Defendants, and done at the behest of the Conspiracy.

109. Defendants’ actions in intentionally placing borrowers into impossible loans in the pursuit of profit , were a substantial factor in if not *the* cause of the generalized market crash which caused the prices of Real Estate values throughout California to plummet, damaging Plaintiffs herein.

110. The unraveling of the Defendants’ scheme has materially depressed the price of real estate throughout California, including the real estate owned by the Plaintiffs, resulting in losses to the Plaintiffs.

111. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ damages herein are exacerbated by a continuing decline in residential property values and further erosion of their credit records.

112. Defendants’ concealments and misrepresentations, both as to the their scheme to profiteer from the mortgage melt-down and as to their purported efforts to resolve loan modifications with Plaintiffs, are substantial factors in causing the harm to Plaintiffs described in this Complaint.

113. Without limiting the damages as described elsewhere in this Complaint, Plaintiffs

1 damages arising from this Cause of Action also include loss of equity in their houses, costs and expenses
2 related to protecting themselves, reduced credit scores, unavailability of credit, increased costs of credit,
3 reduced availability of goods and services tied to credit ratings, increased costs of those services, as well
4 as fees and costs, including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and costs.

5 114. Counts 1 – 5 arise under this Cause of Action, and are brought by all Plaintiffs named in
6 this Cause of Action, against all Defendants named in this Cause of Action.

7
8 **COUNT 1: FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT**

9 115. The preceding paragraphs and the paragraphs following this cause of action are
10 incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein

11 116. Ally and Bank Defendants, at the direction, behest, and on behalf of the Conspiracy of
12 Defendants intentionally concealed the material facts alleged above at Paragraph 76 and 78, in order to
13 induce Plaintiffs reliance into entering into Loan Contracts with Ally and Bank Defendants

14 117. Plaintiffs did in fact rely on the non-existence of the concealed facts in deciding to enter
15 into Loan Contracts with Ally and Bank Defendants. Had Plaintiffs known the truth, they would not
16 have entered into the Loan Contracts.

17 118. Defendants had exclusive knowledge of the truth. Their scheme was built on keeping
18 their borrowers (Plaintiffs herein) in the dark.

19 119. Defendants had a duty to disclose such material information but intentionally failed to do so.

20 120. As a result of such concealments Plaintiffs were damaged as described in this Cause of
21 Action. Without limiting the damages as described elsewhere in this Complaint, Plaintiffs damages
22 arising from this Cause of Action also include loss of equity in their houses, growth in their loan
23 balances resulting from concealed negative amortization, costs and expenses related to protecting
24 themselves, reduced credit scores, unavailability of credit, increased costs of credit, reduced availability
25 of goods and services tied to credit ratings, increased costs of those services, as well as fees and costs,
26 including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and costs.

27 121. Defendants' actions in intentionally placing borrowers into impossible loans in the
28 pursuit of profit, were a substantial factor in if not *the* cause of the generalized market crash which

1 caused the prices of Real Estate values throughout California to plummet, damaging Plaintiffs herein.

2 122. Defendants' intentional, wide-scale, fraudulent conduct also merits the imposition of
3 punitive damages. Plaintiffs respectfully request the award of such punitive damages and any other relief
4 this court shall deem just and proper.

5 **COUNT 2: INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION**

6 123. The preceding paragraphs and the paragraphs following this cause of action are
7 incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein

8 124. Ally and Bank Defendants, at the direction, behest, and on behalf of the Conspiracy of
9 Defendants intentionally misrepresented the material facts alleged above at Paragraphs 77 and 78, in
10 order to induce Plaintiffs reliance into entering into Loan Contracts with Ally and Bank Defendants

11 125. Plaintiffs did in fact rely on the truth of the misrepresented facts in deciding to enter into
12 Loan Contracts with Ally and Bank Defendants. Had Plaintiffs known the truth, they would not have
13 entered into the Loan Contracts.

14 126. Defendants had exclusive knowledge of the truth. Their scheme was built on keeping
15 their borrowers (Plaintiffs herein) in the dark.

16 127. As a result of such intentional misrepresentations Plaintiffs were damaged as described in
17 this Cause of Action. Without limiting the damages as described elsewhere in this Complaint, Plaintiffs
18 damages arising from this Cause of Action also include loss of equity in their houses, loan payments
19 falsely represented to be much lower than what they truly were, growth in their loan balances resulting
20 from negative amortization which Defendants represented would not occur, costs and expenses related
21 to protecting themselves, reduced credit scores, unavailability of credit, increased costs of credit,
22 reduced availability of goods and services tied to credit ratings, increased costs of those services, as well
23 as fees and costs, including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and costs.

24 128. Defendants' actions in intentionally placing borrowers into impossible loans in the
25 pursuit of profit, were a substantial factor in if not *the* cause of the generalized market crash which
26 caused the prices of Real Estate values throughout California to plummet, damaging Plaintiffs herein.

27 129. Defendants' intentional, wide-scale, fraudulent conduct also merits the imposition of
28 punitive damages. Plaintiffs respectfully request the award of such punitive damages and any other relief

1 this court shall deem just and proper.

2 **COUNT 3: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION**

3 130. The preceding paragraphs and the paragraphs following this cause of action are
4 incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.

5 131. The allegations of this Count are identical to those above in the previous Count except
6 that the degree of intent herein is that of negligence. Put another way, at the time Ally and Bank
7 Defendants made the misrepresentations described in this Cause of Action, they did not have reasonable
8 grounds to believe them to be true.

9 **COUNT 4: NEGLIGENCE**

10 132. The preceding paragraphs and the paragraphs following this cause of action are
11 incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein

12 133. Ally and Bank Defendants had a duty to act reasonably, and further had duties of care
13 imposed upon them by law and statute as alleged above at paragraphs 96-102

14 134. In undertaking to place as many borrowers into loans as possible in the pursuit of profit
15 without regard for their ability to afford them, their creditworthiness, or the distinct risk of default
16 (either a known likelihood of default or reckless disregard thereof) and the commensurate effects such
17 wide scale defaults would have on property values and the economic system, Ally and Bank Defendants
18 breached that duty.

19 135. Ally and Bank Defendants further breached their duty by abandoning industry standard
20 underwriting guidelines.

21 136. Ally and Bank Defendants breached their duty in numerous other fashions as described
22 throughout this Complaint, whose allegations in their entirety are incorporated by reference as to all
23 Causes of Action and all Counts.

24 137. In breaching their duty, Ally and Bank Defendants, acting in conspiracy with the other
25 Defendants herein, caused grave damage to Plaintiffs herein and numerous others.

26 138. These harms were foreseeable if not actually foreseen by Defendants.

27 139. Further, Defendants' actions in intentionally placing borrowers into impossible loans in
28 the pursuit of profit, were a substantial factor in if not *the* cause of the generalized market crash which

1 caused the prices of Real Estate values throughout California to plummet, damaging Plaintiffs herein

2 140. Without limiting the damages as described elsewhere in this Complaint, Plaintiffs
3 damages arising from this Cause of Action also include loss of equity in their houses, costs and expenses
4 related to protecting themselves, reduced credit scores, unavailability of credit, increased costs of credit,
5 reduced availability of goods and services tied to credit ratings, increased costs of those services, as well
6 as fees and costs, including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and costs.

7 **COUNT 5 : UNFAIR, UNLAWFUL, AND FRAUDULENT BUSINESS PRACTICES**
8 **(VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §17200)**

9 141. The preceding paragraphs and the paragraphs following this cause of action are
10 incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.

11 142. Ally and Bank Defendants' acts, hand-in-hand with the conspiracy of Defendants, as
12 described in this Cause of Action are Fraudulent as set forth above

13 143. In addition to being fraudulent, Ally and Bank Defendants' actions are also unlawful.
14 Defendants' actions in implementing and perpetrating their fraudulent scheme of inducing Plaintiffs to
15 accept mortgages for which they were not qualified based on inflated property valuations and undisclosed
16 disregard of their own underwriting standards and the sale of overpriced collateralized mortgage pools, all
17 the while knowing that the plan would crash and burn, taking the Plaintiffs down and costing them the
18 equity in their homes and other damages, violates numerous federal and state statutes and common law
19 protections enacted for consumer protection, privacy, trade disclosure, and fair trade and commerce. In
20 addition to being fraudulent and violates numerous federal and state statutes and common law protections
21 enacted for consumer protection, privacy, trade disclosure, and fair trade and commerce.

- 22 a. Ally and Bank Defendants violated the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") by failing to
23 make the necessary disclosures under Law, including the failure to sufficiently disclose
24 the certainty of negative amortization in their Loan Documents as well as the
25 accompanying Truth In Lending Disclosure Statement. These identical allegations have
26 been recognized by the California Court of Appeal in *Boschma*, to give rise to an
27 actionable claim for Fraudulent Concealment, Violation of TILA & Violation of the
28 UCL.

1 b. Defendants further violated TILA by failing to properly disclose or fraudulently hiding
2 prepayment penalties, points, origination discounts, kickbacks, commissions, etc. to
3 Plaintiffs oftentimes resulting in Plaintiff being forced to incur or pay unnecessary or
4 unfair charges which they were never aware of, and which they never had an opportunity
5 to contest.

6 144. The acts of the Conspiracy of Defendants are also patently unfair as more fully set forth
7 above. Without limiting the allegations above which are fully incorporated herein, Defendants acts are
8 unfair insofar as they intentionally place unsuspecting borrowers into loans which jeopardize their
9 financial livelihoods and risk potential homelessness. Simply put, Defendants' scheme is to use
10 borrowers as pawns to increase their profit. It speaks for itself that such acts are patently unfair.

11 145. Such acts and practices violate established public policy and the harm they cause to
12 consumers in California greatly outweighs any benefits associated with those practices.

13 146. These actions were immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous and substantially
14 injurious to similarly situated borrowers, and Plaintiffs herein. Defendants' conduct had no utility other
15 than for their own ill-gotten gain, and the harm was great not only to Plaintiffs herein, but also to
16 residents of California, broadly, who have seen a decrease in their home and property values as a result
17 of the bursting of the super-heated pricing bubble created by Defendants' fraudulently inflated appraisal;
18 at the time of their fraud, Defendants *knew* that their conduct would cause the precipitous decline in
19 property values throughout the State of California. Defendant's acts caused substantial consumer injury
20 with no benefits to consumer competition. Plaintiffs could not have reasonably avoided these injuries
21 occasioned by Defendants' intentional deceit, misrepresentation, and omission. Further, Defendants acts
22 significantly threatened harm to competition.

23 147. The unfair, unlawful and fraudulent acts and practices of Defendants named herein
24 present a continuing threat to Plaintiff and to members of the public in that these acts and practices are
25 ongoing and are harmful and disruptive to business and financial markets.

26 148. Defendant's acts caused substantial consumer injury with no benefits to consumer
27 competition. Plaintiffs could not have reasonably avoided these injuries occasioned by Defendants'
28 intentional deceit, misrepresentation, and omission. Further, Defendants acts significantly threatened

1 harm to competition.

2 149. Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution of the loan payments obtained by Defendants pursuant
3 to their unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices.

4 150. Further, as a result of the foregoing conduct, Plaintiffs suffered injury in fact including
5 diminished credit scores with a concomitant increase in borrowing costs and diminished access to credit,
6 fees and costs, including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and costs.

7 151. As a result of Defendants' unfair competition, Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution for all
8 sums received by Defendants with respect to Defendants' unlawful and/or unfair and/or fraudulent
9 conduct, including, without limitation, interest payments made by Plaintiffs, fees paid to Defendants,
10 including, without limitation, the excessive fees paid at Defendants' direction, and premiums received
11 upon selling the mortgages at an inflated value.

12 152. Finally, as a result of Plaintiffs were placed into larger loans than they could afford or
13 should have been placed into. The additional fees, points and interests paid as a result of the
14 higher/inflated loan amounts constitute damages, and legally cognizable sources of restitution.

15 153. Plaintiffs hereby also request injunctive relief against future violation of the same.
16

17 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: INDIVIDUAL APPRAISAL INFLATION**

18 *(By All Plaintiffs against Ally Defendants and Bank Defendants and HCLS, and all other Defendants*
19 *as Co-Conspirators)*

20 154. An accurate appraisal performed pursuant to a legitimate appraisal process is critical to
21 calculating the loan-to-value ("LTV") ratio, a financial metric commonly used to evaluate the risk
22 associated with a mortgage, and which would also be used as part of the valuation of a Mortgage Backed
23 Security (which were sold on the secondary market for profit). The LTV ratio expresses the amount of
24 the mortgage or loan as a percentage of the appraised value of the collateral property. For example, if a
25 borrower seeks to borrow \$90,000 to purchase a home appraised for \$100,000, the LTV ratio would be
26 \$90,000 divided by \$100,000, or 90% - which was viewed in the industry as a risky loan. Typically any
27 loan over 80% LTV was considered risky, and would require the purchase of "Mortgage Insurance" to
28 insure against the additional risk associated with such high LTV loans. The idea being that a high LTV

1 means that a borrower has invested little of his own money in the property, and is thus more likely to
2 walk away from the property when things get tough. Now imagine the above scenario with a slight
3 modification - instead of the above property being appraised at \$100,000 dollars, the appraisal was
4 manipulated to reflect that the home was instead \$112,500, now the Loan-to-Value ratio would appear
5 as a much safer, and less risky 80% LTV (\$90,000 Loan divided by \$112,500 property value = 80%).

6 155. From an **investor's perspective**, a high LTV ratio represents a greater risk of default on
7 the loan, which means they are unwilling to pay as much for that loan as they would one which was less
8 risky. This is true for a number of reasons. First borrowers with a small equity position in the
9 underlying property have "less to lose" in the event of default. Second, even a slight drop in housing
10 prices might cause a loan with a high LTV ratio to exceed the value of the underlying collateral, which
11 might cause the borrower to default and would prevent the issuing trust recouping its expected return in
12 the case of foreclosure and subsequent sale of the property.

13 156. From the **Defendants' perspective**, Because of their shift from the "originate to hold"
14 model to the "originate to sell" model, Bank Defendants (and the conspiracy of Defendants) were
15 incentivized to enter into as many loans as possible to sell on to the secondary market for profit. Because
16 Bank Defendants weren't holding these loans anymore, they held no risk – they had no reason to ensure
17 that the borrower was adequately qualified, or more importantly, in the context of *this* discussion, that
18 the property had sufficient value, because Bank Defendants immediately turned around and sold that
19 loan. Because investors were willing to pay more for less risky loans (lower LTV loans), Defendants
20 were given an incentive to fraudulently inflate the appraisal values of their property, thus making the
21 collateral (the subject property) of the loan seem safer to the investor, and thus more valuable to them.
22 More value to the investors means more profit to Defendants. And so it began, Bank Defendants acting
23 to the benefit of the conspiracy quickly embarked on a scheme to inflate their appraisals, and more
24 broadly, property values throughout the State of California (discussed below in the Market Fixing Cause
25 of Action), because, in short, they made a *lot more money by doing so*.

26 157. To maximize their loan volume and accordingly profit, Bank Defendants began falsely
27 inflating and intentionally misrepresenting the appraised values of the Plaintiff's subject properties.
28 Their purpose was three-fold :

- 1 a. **First**, by doing so, Bank Defendants induced Plaintiffs to consummate their purchase
2 transactions by falsely and intentionally reassuring them that they were paying what the
3 home was worth, and not more – the result of which was, once again, more loans
4 generated by Defendants and thus more profit. Put another way, Defendants falsely
5 inflated the appraisals of Plaintiffs’ properties in order to assure them that the property
6 was indeed worth what they were paying for it, such that Plaintiff would move forward
7 with the purchase and loan, and not back out. For those who were refinancing, the
8 fraudulent appraisal inflation acted to falsely assure them that sufficient equity existed in
9 their home, to merit incurring additional debt.
- 10 b. **Second**, by doing so, Bank Defendants induced Plaintiffs to consummate their
11 transactions by falsely and intentionally reassuring them that their collateral was sound.
- 12 c. **Third, because investors were willing to pay more for less risky loans (lower LTV**
13 **loans), Defendants were given an incentive to fraudulently inflate the appraisal**
14 **values of their property**, thus making the collateral (the subject property) of the loan
15 seem safer to the investor, and thus more valuable to them. This in turn led to more sales
16 and even more profits on the secondary market.

17 158. To achieve this, Ally and Bank Defendants exercised dominion over Ally’s wholly-owned
18 appraisal subsidiary HCLS, directing them to provide the results requested, or engaged in a practice of
19 pressuring and intimidating HCLS into using appraisal techniques that met Ally and Bank Defendants’
20 business objectives even if the use of such appraisal technique was improper and in violation of industry
21 standards. Ally and Bank Defendant black-listed appraisers who did not provide appraisal reports with
22 their expectations.

23 159. In a scathing complaint filed by the Federal Housing Finance Agency on September 2,
24 2011 they outlined how this brazen planned worked. Ally would use their in-house or contract appraisers
25 at Home Connects Lending Services (HCLS) to artificially inflate Plaintiff’s home values in order for their
26 loans to be used in Securitization transactions.

27 160. According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), they identified “inflated
28 appraisals” as a pervasive problem at Ally during the period of the Securitizations in the time span

1 mentioned in this complaint, and determined through its investigation that appraisers were often
2 pressured by mortgage originators, among others, to “produce inflated results.”

3 161. This coercion by Defendants to fraudulently inflate appraisal values was particularly
4 rampant in the context of refinance transactions. When a property didn’t appraise for a high enough
5 value, a deal wouldn’t “go through” this meant that (1) the loan consultant on the transaction wouldn’t
6 get a commission, (2) the Area Divisions (sometimes referred to as “Home Loan Centers” – often
7 comprised of hundreds of loan consultants over several cities, and managed by a single manager) which
8 were paid handsomely for each funded loan wouldn’t get paid, and (3) Ally and Bank Defendants
9 wouldn’t be able to sell the loan on the secondary market for profit. Nobody made money. However,
10 the system was set up to allow coercion, bribery, and undue influence over the appraisers. Loan
11 consultants would contact appraiser and direct them specifically as to what value was “needed” to make
12 the deal go through, some even going so far as to give gifts to the appraisers, and many were given
13 outright bribes. Area Division managers who also had a financial incentive as mentioned earlier, would
14 exercise undue influence and contact appraisers and demand certain values from them, abolishing the
15 exercise of independent thought necessary to render an accurate/good faith appraisals. The same Area
16 Division Managers, because of their power and influence within the company, would even go so far as
17 to call the appraisal group’s *managers* and request (read “demand”) an appraisal to come in at a certain
18 value, or if that appraisal had already been rendered and it was too low, would request the appraisal
19 value to be “bumped” or increased. The Area Division Managers who often had personal or friendly
20 relationships with HCLS’ Appraisal *managers* would coerce, bribe or influence, give gifts to or “call in
21 favors” from the Appraisal managers to ensure that the appraised value of the subject property was high
22 enough to make the deal “go through,” so that all parties could make their money. The Appraisal
23 managers obliged.

24 162. On other occasions Bank Defendants, hand-in-hand with HCLS, would use overvalued,
25 inflated or out-of-area comps from non-comparable *superior* properties in valuating the subject property
26 for the wrongful purpose of arriving at a higher value than would be supported by nearby or appropriate
27 comps. Bank Defendants intended this to artificially inflate the appraised value of the subject property.

28 163. On the rare occasion when a loan consultant’s or Area Division Manager’s influence

1 didn't get the appraiser to inflate the value of the appraisal by a sufficient amount, Defendants' policies
2 gave them another, more effective way to fraudulently inflate the amount – they were allowed to hire an
3 *outside appraiser*. It was well known in the industry that outside appraisers would deliver an appraisal in
4 the amount they were told to deliver. Why? Because they were being paid directly by the loan
5 consultant, or the Area Division Manager. In other words, loan consultants and Area Division
6 Manager's had outside appraisers "in their pockets." Outside appraisers would deliver the results
7 (meaning inflated values) they were expected to deliver for two reasons: (1) In the interest of keeping
8 the client happy and hopefully earning future business and (2) for fear of not getting paid on their
9 individual deal if they didn't deliver the results they were expected to deliver. This procedure (allowing
10 the hiring of easily-influenced outside appraisers) was explicitly made part of Defendants' own policies,
11 and its use was encouraged by Defendants, as well as their mid-level and upper management.

12 164. This coercion and influence even existed from the **top down** – Regional Managers (in
13 charge of entire portions of the country, several states large) would also call in favors and demand
14 appraised values to be inflated or changed to make deals happen in the interest of making money. This
15 pattern was not only tolerated by Defendants, but ratified and encouraged by them, because more funded
16 loans meant more money for Defendants (who as described above, held none of the risk). In fact,
17 Defendants had intentionally set up the appraisal system in such a way as to allow for the exercise of
18 influence over appraisals and the appraisal departments. This influence was intended and foreseen.

19 165. In short, Ally and Bank Defendants intentionally designed an appraisal system which
20 they could manipulate through influence and coercion to further their own ends – namely, profit. By its
21 very design, the independence of thought necessary for a professional appraiser to render a good faith
22 opinion was decimated. (1) Defendants held dominion over the very appraisal company which was
23 supposed to render independent appraisals, HCLS. Then, (2) Bank Defendants through its explicit (as
24 well as unwritten) policies and procedures, intentionally allowed their own employees who made
25 commission/money as a function of every funded loan (managers, loan consultants, etc.), to contact
26 individual appraisers and bribe, exercise influence, call in favors, harass, and coerce appraisers into
27 rendering the exact value they needed. And finally, when all else failed (3) Defendants set up a fail-
28 safe; they created an internal policy which allowed for the hiring of "outside" appraisers who were

1 particularly well known within the industry for being willing to “fudge” the numbers.

2 166. Alan Hummel, Chair of the Appraisal Institute, testified before the Senate Committee on
3 banking that the dynamic between mortgage originators and appraisers created a “terrible conflict of
4 interest” where appraiser “experience[d] systemic problems of coercion” and were “ordered to doctor
5 their reports” or they might be “placed on exclusionary or ‘do-not-use’ lists.” Too often, this pressure
6 succeeded in generating artificially high appraisals and appraisals being done on a “drive-by” basis
7 which appraisers issued their appraisal without reasonable bases for doing so.

8 167. A 2007 survey of 1,200 appraisers conducted by October Research Corp., which
9 publishes *Valuation Review*, found that 90% of appraisers reported that mortgage brokers and others
10 pressured them to raise property valuations to enable deals to go through. This figure was nearly double
11 the findings of a similar study conducted just three years earlier. The 2007 study also “found that 75% of
12 appraisers reported ‘negative ramifications’ if they did not cooperate, alter their appraisal, and provide a
13 higher valuation.

14 168. Through their intentional misrepresentations and fraudulent appraisal inflation Ally and
15 Bank Defendants, and HCLS intended to induce Plaintiffs’ reliance on the truth of their valuations and
16 representations, and to induce them to move forward with their loan transactions, which were profitable
17 to Bank Defendants and the conspiracy of Defendants – and did indeed induce such reliance.

18 169. A professional appraiser’s (such as those used by Defendants) knowledge of property
19 valuation is vastly superior to that of the lay borrower. The complicated mathematics and calculations
20 of appraisals require highly specialized education. Their training and knowledge is so specialized, in
21 fact, that one cannot act as an appraiser without being properly trained and licensed. It is reasonable and
22 foreseeable that a consumer would rely upon an appraisal arrived at by a professional appraiser –
23 particularly in light of their complicated nature. Plaintiffs did in fact rely on the representations and
24 concealments of these parties.

25 170. Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants and HCLS knew that it was foreseeable that Plaintiffs
26 would rely on their appraisals and/or (mis)representations of values.

27 171. These misrepresentations were material to Plaintiffs decision to enter into the Loans

28 172. Plaintiffs did rely on the truth of such (mis)representations and, in doing so, entered into

1 Loan Contracts with Defendants. Had Plaintiffs known the truth they would not have moved forward
2 with the purchase transactions, or loan transactions.

3 173. Ally and Bank Defendants, together with HCLS, perpetrated this systematic appraisal
4 fraud at the direction of and for the benefit of the conspiracy, and with the knowledge, ratification, and
5 acquiescence of their executives and board members.

6 174. As a result of such Appraisal Inflation, Plaintiffs were induced to pay more for their
7 homes than their true value, induced to take larger loans than would have been necessary, pay larger
8 down payments, pay additional interest, fees, and pay additional property taxes.

9 175. Counts 6 through 9 arise under this (Second) Cause of Action for Individual Appraisal
10 Inflation, and are brought by all Plaintiffs named in this Cause of Action, against all Defendants named
11 in this Cause of Action.

12 **COUNT 6: INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION**

13 176. The preceding paragraphs and the paragraphs following this cause of action are
14 incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.

15 177. Ally and Bank Defendants and HCLS, at the direction, behest, and on behalf of the
16 Conspiracy of Defendants intentionally inflated and misrepresented the true values of Plaintiffs' homes,
17 in order to induce Plaintiffs reliance into entering into Loan Contracts with Ally and Bank Defendants,
18 as described at length throughout this Cause of Action.

19 178. Plaintiffs did in fact rely on the truth of the misrepresented facts in deciding to enter into
20 Loan Contracts with Ally and Bank Defendants. Had Plaintiffs known the truth, they would not have
21 entered into the Loan Contracts.

22 179. Defendants had exclusive knowledge of the truth. Their scheme was built on keeping
23 their borrowers (Plaintiffs herein) in the dark.

24 180. As a result of such Appraisal Inflation, Plaintiffs were induced to pay more for their
25 homes than their true value, induced to take larger loans than would have been necessary, pay larger
26 down payments, pay additional interest, fees, and pay additional property taxes. Without limiting the
27 damages as described elsewhere in this Complaint, Plaintiffs damages arising from this Cause of Action
28 also include loss of equity in their houses, costs and expenses related to protecting themselves, reduced

1 credit scores, unavailability of credit, increased costs of credit, reduced availability of goods and
2 services tied to credit ratings, increased costs of those services, as well as fees and costs, including,
3 without limitation, attorneys' fees and costs.

4 181. Defendants' intentional, wide-scale, fraudulent conduct also merits the imposition of
5 punitive damages. Plaintiffs respectfully request the award of such punitive damages and any other relief
6 this court shall deem just and proper.

7 **COUNT 7: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION**

8 182. The preceding paragraphs and the paragraphs following this cause of action are
9 incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.

10 183. The allegations of this Count are identical to those above in the previous Count except
11 that the degree of intent herein is that of negligence. Put another way, at the time of the
12 misrepresentations described in this Cause of Action (and listed in part above), Ally and Bank
13 Defendants and HCLS did not have reasonable grounds to believe them to be true.

14 **COUNT 8: NEGLIGENCE**

15 184. The preceding paragraphs and the paragraphs following this cause of action are
16 incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein

17 185. Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants and HCLS had a duty to act reasonably, and further
18 had duties of care imposed upon them by law and statute as alleged above at paragraphs 97-103 to
19 provide accurate appraisals. Such duties are also established by the applicable standards of care within
20 the profession.

21 186. In falsely inflating and causing to be inflated the appraisals of Plaintiffs herein Ally
22 Defendants, HCLS and Bank Defendants breached that duty.

23 187. In (recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally) placing borrowers into loans upon which they
24 would be instantly upside down and be instantly upside down by virtue of inflated valuations – all so that the
25 Conspiracy of Defendants could profit - Ally and Bank Defendants further breached their duty.

26 188. In (recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally) furnishing false and inflated appraisals – all so
27 that the Conspiracy of Defendants could profit – Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants, and HCLS further
28 breached their duty.

1 189. In (recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally) failing to observe the standards of care in the
2 appraisal profession, HCLS breached its duty.

3 190. In undertaking to place as many borrowers into loans as possible in the pursuit of profit
4 without regard for their ability to afford them, their creditworthiness, or the distinct risk of default
5 (either a known likelihood of default or reckless disregard thereof) and the commensurate effects such
6 wide scale defaults would have on property values and the economic system, Ally and Bank Defendants
7 breached that duty.

8 191. Ally and Bank Defendant additionally breached their duty by coercing and bribing their
9 appraisers, as well as subjecting their appraisers to conflicts of interest, as more fully set forth in this
10 Cause of Action.

11 192. HCLS additionally breached their duty by accepting such bribes, and/or acting under
12 known conflicts of interest, as more fully set forth in this Cause of Action.

13 193. Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants and HCLS breached their duty in numerous other
14 fashions as described throughout this Complaint, whose allegations in their entirety are incorporated by
15 reference as to all Causes of Action and all Counts.

16 194. In breaching that duty Ally and Bank Defendants, and HCLS acting in conspiracy with
17 the other Defendants herein, caused grave damage to Plaintiffs herein and numerous others.

18 195. These harms were foreseeable if not actually foreseen by Defendants.

19 196. Defendants' actions in intentionally manipulating and inflating appraised property values,
20 were a substantial factor in if not *the* cause of the generalized market crash which caused the prices of
21 Real Estate values throughout California to plummet, damaging Plaintiffs herein.

22 197. Further, Defendants' actions in intentionally placing borrowers into impossible loans in
23 the pursuit of profit , were a substantial factor in if not *the* cause of the generalized market crash which
24 caused the prices of Real Estate values throughout California to plummet, damaging Plaintiffs herein

25 198. Without limiting the damages as described elsewhere in this Complaint, Plaintiffs
26 damages arising from this Cause of Action also include loss of equity in their houses, costs and expenses
27 related to protecting themselves, reduced credit scores, unavailability of credit, increased costs of credit,
28 reduced availability of goods and services tied to credit ratings, increased costs of those services, as well

1 as fees and costs, including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and costs.

2
3 **COUNT 9: UNFAIR, UNLAWFUL, AND FRAUDULENT BUSINESS PRACTICES**
4 **(VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §17200)**

5 199. The preceding paragraphs and the paragraphs following this cause of action are
6 incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.

7 200. Ally and Bank Defendants' acts in intentionally causing falsely inflated appraisals in
8 order to induce their borrowers to move forward with Loans were unlawful, unfair, **and** fraudulent – all
9 in the disjunctive.

10 201. Such acts are **fraudulent** for all of the reasons described above, whose allegations are
11 hereby incorporated by reference.

12 202. These acts are also **unlawful**.

13 203. California Civil Code §1090.5 "Valuation of real estate; improper influence; violation"
14 forbids the exercise of influence over the valuation of property by any person with an interest in that real
15 estate transaction. Defendants have violated this law.

- 16 a. Bank Defendants and their Co-conspirators herein had a direct interest in the valuation of
17 real estate transactions at issue, as they were the institution that was lending on the
18 property, and moreover because they stood to profit from the consummation of the real
19 estate transaction – which depended in large part on a sufficient valuation being returned
20 by the appraiser. Their wrongful influence occurred in connection with the "development,
21 reporting, result, or review of that valuation" in accord with the language of the statute.
- 22 b. Defendants herein both in their individual capacity, and in their capacity as co-
23 conspirators with one another and with HCLS (Ally's wholly-owned appraisal
24 management company) have violated California Civil Code §1090.5 by violating
25 appraiser independence through, among other things, compensation, coercion, extortion,
26 bribery, intimidation of their appraisers, as well as the appraisal management company
27 itself, and its management and executives, as well as other independent, outside, or "fee
28 appraisers" not employed by Nationwide Appraisals.

- c. As described throughout this Complaint at length, Citi and Defendants herein as well as their employees, officers, and agents intentionally:
- d. Caused the appraisers to base the value of their appraisals on a factor other than the independent judgment of the appraiser;
- e. Mischaracterized and/or suborned the mischaracterization of the appraised value of the property securing the extension of credit;
- f. Sought to influence the appraiser to facilitating the making of and pricing of their transactions;
- g. Sought to influence the appraiser to achieve a targeted value;
- h. Withheld or threatened to withhold payment for the appraisal services rendered in conformity with the contract between the parties;
- i. Implied, directly or indirectly or threatened that the future retention of the appraiser was contingent upon their return of a satisfactory valuation; and
- j. Excluded other appraisers from rendering future valuations based on the return of valuations which did not meet a certain target in the past.
- k. Defendants acted with malice and with the intent of artificially inflating California Real estate properties generally, as well as the values of Plaintiffs' individual properties and homes.

204. As alleged at length above, Bank Defendants violated California Civil Code §1090.4 by subjecting, both, their appraisers as well as their appraisal management company, to coercion, undue influence, bribery, instruction, appraiser selection manipulation, financial pressure, as well as threats – both explicit and implicit – that if their appraisals didn't come back in at value (1) future business with the appraisers would either diminish or discontinue altogether or (2) that the individual appraiser would be blacklisted.

205. Ally and Bank Defendants also violated 15 U.S.C. §1639e (entitled "Violation of Appraiser Independence") by violating appraiser independence through, among other things, compensation, coercion, extortion, bribery, intimidation of their appraisers, as well as the appraisal management company itself, and its management and executives, as well as other independent, outside,

1 or "fee appraisers" not employed by their Appraisal management company.

- 2 a. Ally and Bank Defendants herein were in the business of extending credit and providing
3 services related to the extension of credit in the consumer credit transactions secured by
4 the principal dwelling of the customer – Plaintiffs herein.
- 5 b. As described throughout this Complaint at length, Ally and Bank Defendants herein as
6 well as their employees, officers, and agents, while acting for the benefit of the
7 Conspiracy of Defendants intentionally:
- 8 i. Caused the appraisers to base the value of their appraisals on a factor other than
9 the independent judgment of the appraiser;
- 10 ii. Mischaracterized and/or suborned the mischaracterization of the appraised value
11 of the property securing the extension of credit
- 12 iii. Sought to influence the appraiser to facilitating the making of and pricing of their
13 transactions;
- 14 iv. Sought to influence the appraiser to achieve a targeted value; and
- 15 v. Withheld or threatened to withhold payment for the appraisal services rendered in
16 conformity with the contract between the parties.

17 206. Ally and Bank Defendants and HCLS, acting on behalf of the Conspiracy also violated
18 12 C.F.R §323.5 by allowing their staff appraisers to have an direct or indirect financial or other interest
19 in the property, namely Ally and Bank Defendants and HCLS often bribed, or incentivized their staff
20 appraisers for who appraised homes whose loans ended up funding, and further by penalizing and
21 denying the appraiser pay for not valuing a property at a high enough value.

- 22 a. As to fee appraisers, outside appraisers and independent appraisers, Ally and Bank
23 Defendants and HCLS also violated 12 C.F.R. §323.5 in knowingly allowing their loan
24 consultants, brokers, and other such loan origination employees to engage the appraisers
25 themselves directly, knowing that such employees would exercise influence over the
26 appraisers. Further, these fee/outside/independent appraisers were given a direct interest
27 in the transaction – their pay and the possibility of future business would often be
28 contingent on the results they provided, namely high values.

1 b. Additionally, Ally and Bank Defendants and HCLS violated this section as to both Staff
2 and “fee”/outside/independent appraisers by “blacklisting” any appraiser who
3 consistently brought back lower values than expected. In other words, Defendants
4 conditioned the appraiser’s very job on their willingness to “play ball” – a strong
5 financial interest in the value of the property if ever there were any. Appraisers who
6 would bring back conservative or low values were let go and never re-hired. This was a
7 well-known reality within the appraisal and banking industry and influenced the
8 independence of thought of any appraiser working with a big bank such as bank
9 Defendant Banks herein. Defendants intended the threat of being blacklisted to deter
10 appraisers from rendering uninhibited good faith appraisals and instead to influence
11 appraisers to exaggerate their values. When taken in the aggregate, Defendants’ policies,
12 coercion and acts resulted in the systematic and artificial inflation of California real estate
13 values (as discussed below in the “**Market Fixing**” Cause of Action).

14 c. The loan transactions alleged in this cause of action qualify as “federally regulated
15 transactions” under the statute because such transactions are defined in the definition
16 section of the statute as “any real-estate-related financial transaction entered into on or
17 after August 9, 1990 that... requires the services of an appraiser.”

18 207. Further, Defendants acts in tricking borrowers to enter into Loans with them by
19 intentionally misleading them about the value of their homes, are fundamentally **unfair** and deceptive.
20 Defendants knowingly placed Plaintiffs borrowers in a position of peril, for their own personal gain.

21 208. No business, particularly one as centrally-important to the American economy as
22 banking, should be allowed to so egregiously deceive its consumers. If Banks are to conduct business,
23 their business *must not be* that of fraud and deception.

24 209. Without limiting the allegations above which are fully incorporated herein, Bank
25 Defendants’ acts are **unfair** insofar as they intentionally place unsuspecting borrowers into loans which
26 jeopardize their financial livelihoods and risk potential homelessness. Simply put, Defendants’ scheme
27 is to use borrowers as pawns to increase their profit. It speaks for itself that such acts are patently unfair.

28 210. Such acts and practices violate established public policy and the harm they cause to

1 consumers in California greatly outweighs any benefits associated with those practices.

2 211. These actions were immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous and substantially
3 injurious to similarly situated borrowers, and Plaintiffs herein. Ally and Bank Defendants' and HCLS's
4 conduct had no utility other than for their own personal gain, and the harm was great not only to
5 Plaintiffs herein, but also to residents of California, broadly, who have seen a decrease in their home and
6 property values as a result of the bursting of the super-heated pricing bubble created by Defendants'
7 fraudulently inflated appraisal; at the time of their fraud, Defendants *knew* that their conduct would
8 cause the precipitous decline in property values throughout the State of California. Defendant's acts
9 caused substantial consumer injury with no benefits to consumer competition. Plaintiffs could not have
10 reasonably avoided these injuries occasioned by Defendants' intentional deceit, misrepresentation, and
11 omission. Further, Defendants acts significantly threatened harm to competition.

12 212. Defendant's acts caused substantial consumer injury with no benefits to consumer
13 competition. Plaintiffs could not have reasonably avoided these injuries occasioned by Defendants'
14 intentional deceit, misrepresentation, and omission. Further, Defendants acts significantly threatened
15 harm to competition.

16 213. Defendants acted with malice and with the intent of artificially inflating California Real
17 estate properties generally, as well as the values of Plaintiffs' individual properties and homes.

18 214. As a result of Defendants' unfair competition, Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution for all
19 sums received by Defendants with respect to Defendants' unlawful and/or unfair and/or fraudulent
20 conduct, including, without limitation, interest payments made by Plaintiffs, fees paid to Defendants,
21 including, without limitation, the excessive fees paid at Defendants' direction, and premiums received
22 upon selling the mortgages at an inflated value.

23 215. Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution of the loan payments obtained by Defendants pursuant
24 to their unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices.

25 216. Further, as a result of the foregoing conduct, Plaintiffs suffered injury in fact including
26 diminished credit scores with a concomitant increase in borrowing costs and diminished access to credit,
27 fees and costs, including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and costs.

28 217. Finally, as a result of these acts, Plaintiffs were placed into larger loans than they could

1 afford or should have been placed into. The additional fees, points and interests paid as a result of the
2 higher/inflated loan amounts constitute damages, and legally cognizable sources of restitution.

3 218. The unfair, unlawful and fraudulent acts and practices of Defendants named herein present a
4 continuing threat to Plaintiff and to members of the public in that these acts and practices are ongoing and are
5 harmful and disruptive to business and financial markets and merit the award of injunctive relief.

6
7 **THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: MARKET FIXING**

8 *(By All Plaintiffs against Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants, and HCLS, and all other Defendants as*
9 *Co-Conspirators)*

10 219. To further the wrongs alleged throughout this Complaint (and its profit), Ally and Bank
11 Defendants, using its size and prominent market share, began **systematically** creating false and inflated
12 property appraisals **throughout California**, hand-in-hand with their wholly-owned appraisal subsidiary
13 HCLS, in a Market Fixing Scheme designed to inflate the property values of homes throughout
14 California. (The "Market Fixing Scheme").

15 220. Though conceptually related to the Cause of Action for Individual Appraisal Inflation,
16 the harms, actions, and reasons behind the Market Fixing Scheme were unique.

17 221. From **Bank Defendants' perspective**, their reasons (in other words, their intent) for
18 fraudulently inflating Plaintiff's appraisals and engaging in the Market Fixing Scheme was three-fold:

- 19 a. **First, by doing so Bank Defendants created the illusion of a naturally appreciating**
20 **real economy, which resulted in a purchase *and* refinance boom** – which meant more
21 loans for Bank Defendants, and thus more profit for the conspiracy of Defendants. And
22 so it began, Defendants together with HCLS quickly embarked on a scheme to inflate
23 their appraisals, and more broadly, property values throughout the State of California,
24 because, in short, they made a *lot more money by doing so*.
- 25 b. **Second**, by systematically driving the prices of real estate up, borrowers were required to
26 take out larger loans to afford the same property, once again resulting in more profit to
27 Defendants. The damages to Plaintiffs resulting from these larger loans are discussed
28 below.

1 c. **Third**, Defendants falsely inflated the appraised values, because by doing so Defendants
2 were able to turn more profit on the sale of these loans to investors. Because investors
3 were willing to pay more for less risky loans (lower Loan-to-Value loans), Ally
4 Defendants, Bank Defendants and HCLS were given an incentive to fraudulently inflate
5 the appraisal values of their property, thus making the collateral (the subject property) of
6 the loan seem safer to the investor, resulting in more profit to Defendants.

7 222. To carry out this fraud, Ally and Bank Defendants used its size and market share as one
8 of the largest lenders in California to systematically create false and inflated property appraisals
9 throughout California, hand-in-hand with their wholly-owned appraisal subsidiary, HCLS.

10 223. At Ally and Bank Defendants' direction, HCLS began systematically and wrongfully
11 inflating the valuations of properties throughout California – not just on the properties of Plaintiffs
12 herein, but on all properties throughout California. As is common knowledge in the real estate industry,
13 appraisers take the value of other nearby homes (called comparables aka “comps”) into account in
14 determining the value of the homes they appraise. **These inflated appraisals and home valuation**
15 **conducted by Ally and Bank Defendants and their subsidiaries *then* acted as comps upon which**
16 **numerous *other* appraisers based their valuations of *other* homes. The results were a vicious self-**
17 **feeding exponential cycle, both expected and intended by Defendants. These inflated appraisals**
18 **caused other homes to be valued for more than they were worth, which in turn acted as the**
19 **predicate for even higher appraisals and which caused even more homes to be valued for more**
20 **than they were worth.** The inevitable and intended result of Defendants' conspiracy was the creation of
21 a super-heated pricing bubble in the real estate economy, created by and at the direction of Defendants,
22 designed to manipulate and inflate property values, and effectuated for the sole purpose of lining
23 Defendants' pockets with money. The harm it inflicted to Plaintiffs herein, California's real estate
24 economy, and more broadly, the American economy mattered little. Defendants were making money
25 and plenty of it.

26 224. Moreover, as Ally's wholly owned subsidiary, HCLS was specifically directed by
27 Defendants to systematically “bump” or inflate appraisal values of homes throughout California, with
28 the intent of creating housing appreciation, leading to a real estate boom, which Defendants could then

1 capitalize on by selling not only more loans, but more loans at even higher loan amounts. From the very
2 top to the very bottom, Defendants created a system intended to render consistently inflated appraisals.
3 But they knew the ‘boom’ they were creating, was one stilted up and fueled by their fraud – and that
4 when the music stopped playing the house of cards they’d built would come crumbling down destroying
5 any and all equity Plaintiff borrowers had in their home.

6 225. Rapidly, these two intertwined schemes (the Market Fixing Scheme [Third Cause of
7 Action], and the Scheme to place borrowers into loans they could not afford [First Cause of Action]) grew
8 into a brazen plan to disregard underwriting standards and fraudulently inflate property values – county-
9 by-county, city-by-city, person-by-person – in order to take business from legitimate mortgage-providers,
10 and moved on to massive securities fraud hand-in-hand with concealment from, and deception of,
11 Plaintiffs and other mortgagees on an unprecedented scale.

12 226. According to the April 7, 2010 FCIC testimony of Richard Bitner, a former executive of
13 a subprime mortgage originator for 15 years and the author of the book *Confessions of a Subprime*
14 *Lender*, “the appraisal process [was] highly susceptible to manipulation, lenders had to conduct business
15 as though the broker and appraiser couldn’t be trusted, [and] either the majority of appraisers were
16 incompetent or they were influenced by brokers to increase the value.” He continued:

17 To put things in perspective, during my company’s history, half of all the loans we
18 underwrote were overvalued by as much as 10%. This means one out of two appraisals was
19 still within an acceptable tolerance for our end investors. Our experiences showed that 10%
20 was the most an appraisal could be overvalued and still be purchased by investors. Another
21 quarter that we reviewed was overvalued by 11-20%. These loans were either declined or we
22 reduced the property to an acceptable tolerance level. The remaining 25% of appraisals that
23 we initially underwrote were so overvalued they defied all logic. *Throwing a dart at a board*
24 *while blindfolded would’ve produced more accurate results*

25 227. Mr. Bitner testified about the implications of inflated appraisals:

26 **If multiple properties in an area are overvalued by 10%, they become comparable**
27 **sales for future appraisals. The process then repeats itself.** We saw it on several
28 occasions. We’d close a loan in January, and see the subject property show up as a
comparable sale in the same neighborhood six months later. Except this time, the new
subject property, which was nearly identical in size and style to the home we financed in
January, was being appraised for 10% more. Of course, demand is a key component to
driving value, but the defective nature of the appraisal process served as an accelerant.

228. Mr. Bitner testified that the engine behind the increased malfeasance was the Wall Street

1 Banks: “[T]he demand from Wall Street investment banks to feed the securitization machines coupled
2 with an erosion in credit standards led the industry to drive itself off the proverbial cliff.”

3 229. In a scathing complaint filed by the Federal Housing Finance Agency on September 2,
4 2011 they outlined how this brazen planned worked. Ally and Bank Defendants would use their in-
5 house or contract appraisers to artificially inflate Plaintiff’s home values in order for their loans to be
6 used in Securitization transactions. According to that complaint, “an inflated appraisal will understate,
7 sometimes greatly, the credit risk associated with a given loan”, mainly our Plaintiffs’ homes.

8 230. According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), they identified “inflated
9 appraisals” as a pervasive problem at Ally during the period of the Securitizations in the time span
10 mentioned in this complaint, and determined through its investigation that appraisers were often
11 pressured by mortgage originators, among others, to “produce inflated results”.

12 231. Since California homes (including those of Plaintiffs herein) were Ally and Bank
13 Defendants’ main target, this scheme led directly to a mortgage meltdown for Plaintiffs in this complaint
14 that was substantially worse than any economic problems facing Defendants’ borrowers in the rest of the
15 United States.

16 232. At the time of their respective Purchase and/or Loan Transactions Plaintiffs relied on the
17 fact that the real estate market was operating normally, and thus the prices Plaintiffs were paying were
18 naturally occurring, uninflated prices – a reasonable reliance.

19 233. Ally and Bank Defendants and HCLS however intentionally failed to disclose the
20 material fact that the market was not operating normally – but rather that they had systematically and
21 intentionally manipulated the market hand-in-hand with their co-conspirators, to inflate real estate prices
22 for their own profit.

23 234. Specifically, Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants and HCLS intentionally **concealed** the
24 material facts that they:

- 25 a. had intentionally and falsely inflated the appraisals on Plaintiffs properties throughout
26 California;
27 b. had subjected their appraisers over whom they exercised complete dominion to a massive
28 conflict of interest precluding them from being able to render good-faith, accurate,

- 1 technically proper appraisals in conformity with the standards required in the profession;
- 2 c. had systematically, intentionally, and artificially inflated the prices of real estate
- 3 throughout California (otherwise known as “market fixing”), resulting in:
- 4 d. had fixed the real-estate market and systematically driven the prices of property well
- 5 above what they were worth, with the intent of creating the illusion of a naturally-
- 6 appreciating real estate economy to spur a purchase and refinance boom resulting in more
- 7 business and thus more profits for the bank;
- 8 e. knew that the true uninflated value of Plaintiffs’ homes were insufficient to justify the
- 9 size of the loans Plaintiffs were being given;
- 10 f. falsely inflated the appraisals of Plaintiffs’ properties in order to place Plaintiffs into
- 11 loans that they would not otherwise be able to obtain or afford, all so Defendants and
- 12 their employee-Loan Consultants could turn profit;
- 13 g. falsely inflated the appraisals of Plaintiffs’ properties in order to assure them that the
- 14 property was indeed worth what they were paying for it, such that Plaintiff would move
- 15 forward with the purchase;
- 16 h. falsely inflated the appraisals of Plaintiffs’ properties to induce plaintiffs to enter into
- 17 loan and assure them that their collateral was sound;
- 18 i. knew that the values being used did not justify the size of the loans being placed on the
- 19 property, and moreover that Defendants knew such valuations would inevitably result in
- 20 the home going “upside” down followed by inevitable default
- 21 j. knew their scheme would cause a liquidity crisis that would devastate home prices.

22 235. As a result everybody, even people who didn’t originate their loans through or get an

23 appraisal from Defendants, were forced to purchase their homes for a higher price than they should

24 absent Defendants’ Market Fixing activities – the additional amounts they were forced to pay constitute

25 substantial damage to Plaintiffs.

26 236. This underscores the difference between the Broad Market Fixing Scheme and the Cause

27 of Action for Individual Appraisal Inflation. Yes, they are conceptually related in the sense that

28 Defendants’ individual appraisal inflations when taken in the aggregate had the intended cumulative

1 effect of further bolstering their market manipulation/inflation. But their conceptual relationship does
2 not make them the same fraud. Unlike the Broad Market Fixing fraud which involved the fraudulent
3 **concealment** of the material fact that they had manipulated the market for the reasons listed in
4 paragraph 221 of this Complaint, the Individual Appraisal inflation was an **affirmative intentional**
5 **misrepresentation** of the individual values of Plaintiffs' homes for the reasons listed in paragraph 157
6 of this Complaint (i.e. "with the intent of inducing Plaintiffs to enter into their loans... and with the
7 intent of assuring them their collateral was sound", *inter alia*).

8 237. As a result of Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants and HCLS' Market Fixing Activities, in
9 furtherance of the Conspiracy of Defendants, Plaintiffs were harm harmed in each of the following
10 manners:

- 11 a. **First**, the hyper-inflated property values resulting from Defendants' inflated appraisals
12 and market-fixing scheme directly caused Plaintiffs to pay a substantially higher price for
13 their home than they would have otherwise, and then their home was truly worth at the
14 time. The additional amounts Plaintiffs were forced to pay above and beyond the true
15 uninflated value of their property at the time of purchase, constitutes damage to Plaintiffs
16 directly caused by Defendant's scheme.
- 17 b. **Second**, the damage didn't end there however - the unraveling of Defendants' scheme
18 caused the market to be sent into a downward spiral, which Defendants knew and
19 foresaw would be the result of their actions, and caused Plaintiffs' home value to
20 plummet *much below the true value* of the property at the time of purchase. **To be clear,**
21 **it is alleged that Defendants' Appraisal Inflation and Market Fixing Activities, were**
22 **a substantial factor in if not the cause of the generalized market crash which caused**
23 **the prices of Real Estate values throughout California to plummet.** This is a separate
24 and distinct loss from item number "a" – item "a" deals with false inflation, while item
25 "b" alleges diminution in value/depression. These two losses in sum constitute Plaintiffs'
26 loss of equity, and can be determined by subtracting the current depressed value of
27 Plaintiffs' property from the artificially inflated price they were forced to purchase it for.
28 Even for those Plaintiffs who did not purchase their property, but rather refinanced it, the

1 demise of Defendants' scheme drove the value of their property far below its original
2 purchase price, once again resulting in the loss of substantial equity;

3 c. **Third**, another intended effect of Defendants' silent market-fixing/appraisal inflation
4 fraud was that Plaintiffs were forced to take out larger loans to purchase the inflated-
5 value homes. Not only were Plaintiffs forced to pay additional principal on this
6 artificially created-value, but additional interest as well. As an example, let's say that
7 because of Defendants' market inflation, Plaintiffs purchased a home for \$600,000 (when
8 in reality its true uninflated value would have been \$500,000), and took a loan from
9 Defendants at 6% interest. Not only were Plaintiffs forced to pay \$100,000 more for this
10 home than they should have had to, but they were also forced to pay interest on that
11 additional \$100,000 in false value, in the amount of \$500 dollars per month. Had
12 Defendants abstained from conducting their fraud, Plaintiffs would never have needed to
13 pay the interest on this falsely created value. The additional interest Plaintiffs were forced
14 to pay constitutes damage to Plaintiffs;

15 d. **Fourth**, for the same reason as directly above (in sub-paragraph "b"), Plaintiffs were also
16 forced to pay additional fees and points (all of which are a function of the inflated loan
17 size). As is common knowledge throughout the industry, lenders, including Defendants
18 herein, often charge what are known as "points" to originate a loan. Charging one "point"
19 is another way of saying that the bank will charge you 1% of your loan amount. Two
20 points would be 2% of the loan amount. Now, using the above example (of a 500k home,
21 artificially inflated to 600k), let's say a borrower was forced to pay 2 points (or in other
22 words 2% of his total loan amount). Because the loan amount was inflated he was forced
23 to pay 2% of 600k (\$12,000), when in reality, had Defendants not embarked on their
24 scheme, he would only have had to pay 2% of 500k (\$10,000). The additional \$2,000
25 paid (\$12,000 - \$10,000) constitutes additional damage.

26 e. **Fifth**, the falsely-inflated property values also caused Plaintiffs to pay substantially
27 higher property taxes.

28 f. **Sixth**, Bank Defendants also used these inflated values, to induce Plaintiffs and other

1 borrowers into entering ever-larger loans on increasingly risky terms. The result was
2 more money for the conspiracy of Defendants.

3 g. **Seventh**, The resultant higher payments coupled with the housing crash (both known if
4 not intended by Defendants) resulted in Plaintiffs' inevitable default, wreaking havoc
5 with their credit, and upon which Bank Defendants and Trustee Defendants charged a
6 host of excessive fees (trustee fees, default fees, cleanup fees, inspection fees, late fees,
7 advance fees, and attorney fees) all of which were marked up dramatically. In short,
8 Defendants couldn't lose; they were making money no matter what, and were benefitting
9 from Plaintiffs' default. By tossing on so many fees Defendants made it impossible for
10 Plaintiffs to be able to ever pay off their "default" amounts. Why? Because Defendants
11 made money by doing so. Recall, that by this time, Defendant Banks had already sold
12 these loans to their investors, and were only acting as servicers. Servicers have
13 significantly different motivations than do lenders. Servicers earn more from foreclosing
14 even when the noteholder (investors) may benefit financially in the long-term by
15 modifying Plaintiffs' loans. And because they were servicers (rather than note-holders),
16 Bank Defendants' incentives were not to preserve the loans and prevent default, but
17 rather to the contrary, they made money initiating foreclosures and charging fees. In other
18 words Defendant Banks' interests as a servicer were exactly the opposite of those when
19 they originated the loan and were note-holders. Their interests were aligned directly with
20 those of a servicer. They had become anything but a conventional money lender. By
21 making it impossible for Plaintiffs to pay off their unilaterally imposed default amounts,
22 Defendants could come in and scoop up whatever equity Plaintiffs had left in the
23 property. It was a win, win, win scenario.

24 238. Bank Defendants', Ally Defendants', and HCLS's fraudulent inflation and manipulation
25 of real estate values throughout the State of California, the demise of which sent real estate values
26 spiraling downwards, caused Plaintiffs to be placed in homes that were immediately upside-down, and
27 to instantly lose their equity – if not their homes altogether. And as a result of these two schemes
28 coupled together (the scheme to place borrowers into loans they could not afford, and the Market Fixing

1 Scheme), Plaintiff-borrowers were placed into loans far larger than would be supported by the true value
2 of their property or their income. Then, based on these fraudulently inflated loan amounts, Defendants
3 deceptively extracted excessive and unearned payments, points, fees, and interest from Plaintiffs – all of
4 which comprise damage to Plaintiffs.

5 239. As a result of the improper scheme undertaken by Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants
6 and HCLS, at the behest and benefit of the Conspiracy, Plaintiffs paid more for their homes than they
7 should have, then adding insult to injury lost their equity in their homes, their credit ratings and histories
8 were damaged or destroyed, and Plaintiffs incurred material other costs and expenses, described herein.
9 At the same time, Defendants took from Plaintiffs and other borrowers billions of dollars in interest
10 payments and fees and generated billions of dollars in illegal and fraudulently obtained profits by selling
11 their loans at inflated values and using the loans as collateral for fraudulent swaps.

12 240. Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants and HCLS perpetrated this systematic individual
13 appraisal inflation and market fixing scheme at the direction of and for the benefit of the conspiracy, and
14 with the knowledge and acquiescence of their executives and board members.

15 241. Defendants had exclusive knowledge of their silent scheme to inflate appraisals and fix
16 the market.

17 242. Counts 10-13 arise under this (Third) Cause of Action for Market Fixing, and are brought
18 by all Plaintiffs named in this Cause of Action, against all Defendants named in this Cause of Action.

19 **COUNT 10: FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT**

20 243. All preceding and following paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated by reference
21 as though fully set forth herein

22 244. Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants, and HCLS, at the direction, behest, and on behalf of
23 the Conspiracy of Defendants intentionally concealed the material facts alleged above at Paragraph 234
24 (a)-(j), (namely their systematic market fixing activities) in order to induce Plaintiffs reliance into
25 entering into Loan Contracts with Ally and Bank Defendants

26 245. Plaintiffs did in fact rely on the non-existence of the concealed facts in deciding to enter
27 into Loan Contracts with Ally and Bank Defendants. Had Plaintiffs known the truth, they would not
28 have entered into the Loan Contracts.

1 246. Defendants had exclusive knowledge of the truth. Their scheme was built on keeping
2 their borrowers (Plaintiffs herein) in the dark.

3 247. Bank Defendants, Ally Defendants, and HCLS, had a duty to disclose such material
4 information but intentionally failed to do so.

5 248. As a result of such concealments Plaintiffs were damaged as described in this Cause of
6 Action as set forth above in Paragraph 237(a)-(g)

7 249. Further, without limiting the damages as described elsewhere in this Complaint, Plaintiffs
8 damages arising from this Cause of Action also include loss of equity in their houses,, costs and
9 expenses related to protecting themselves, reduced credit scores, unavailability of credit, increased costs
10 of credit, reduced availability of goods and services tied to credit ratings, increased costs of those
11 services, as well as fees and costs, including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and costs.

12 250. Defendants' actions in systematically and falsely pumping up real estate values
13 throughout California, were a substantial factor in if not *the* cause of the generalized market crash which
14 caused the prices of Real Estate values throughout California to plummet, damaging Plaintiffs herein.

15 251. These harms were both known and foreseen, if not intended, by the Conspiracy of
16 Defendants.

17 252. Defendants' intentional, wide-scale, fraudulent conduct also merits the imposition of
18 punitive damages. Plaintiffs respectfully request the award of such punitive damages and any other relief
19 this court shall deem just and proper.

20 **COUNT 11: NEGLIGENCE**

21 253. All preceding paragraphs and following paragraphs are hereby incorporated as though
22 fully set forth herein.

23 254. Specifically, each and every allegation of Count 8 (for Negligence) arising under the
24 *previous* Cause of Action for Individual Appraisal Inflation, are set forth identically herein and
25 realleged here, in the interest of brevity. All of the wrongs and harms alleged in that Count are
26 specifically brought here in this Count as well.

27 255. In addition to the allegations of Count 8, Plaintiffs further allege as follows.

28 256. Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants, and HCLS additionally breached their duty by

1 maliciously (or alternatively, knowingly, or recklessly) inflating values of real estate throughout
2 California in a Market Fixing Scheme, as described throughout this Cause of Action.

3 **COUNT 12: PRICE FIXING - VIOLATION OF SHERMAN ACT 15 USC §1 ET SEQ.**

4 257. All preceding paragraphs and following paragraphs are hereby incorporated as though
5 fully set forth herein.

6 258. The Market Fixing Scheme alleged throughout this Cause of Action falls within the
7 definition of a price fixing conspiracy under 15 USC §1 et Seq

8 259. Plaintiffs herein bring this count for injuries occurring as a direct result of Ally and Bank
9 Defendants' and HCLS's (and their Co-Conspirator's) Price Fixing conspiracy, as described throughout
10 this Cause of Action ("Market Fixing").

11 260. Ally and Bank Defendants herein were among the leading lenders at all times alleged
12 herein and had sizeable market share, individually and collectively.

13 261. The purpose and effect of this anti-competitive conspiracy was to fix, raise, and stabilize
14 the prices of homes throughout California, in order to bolster and increase Defendants' profits at the
15 expense and injury of their borrowers, as well as other fairly competing lending institutions. These
16 actions led to commensurate inflation of real estate values in states contiguous to California.

17 262. Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants and HCLS collusively and affirmatively conspired
18 with one another to artificially raise the values of real estate throughout California, with effects
19 spreading throughout contiguous states, because in doing so, all parties would see significantly more
20 profit. The Bank Defendants were able to charge higher loan amounts, higher interest, and higher fees
21 and points, while simultaneously able to increase their sales on the secondary market by creating the
22 substantially false impression that the loans being sold were less risky than they were. Because of the
23 intentionally increased danger of their loans, and increased likelihood of default the Servicing
24 Defendants were able to collect highly lucrative late fees, default fees, and other such fees. Both
25 Lending and Servicing Defendants turned additional profit when their borrowers, through their
26 coordinated acts of deception and Market Fixing inevitably defaulted and were foreclosed upon, because
27 Lending and Servicing Defendants were profitably insured against loss. Finally the Trustee Defendants
28 also profited through this price fixing scheme in that more foreclosures allowed them to collect lucrative

1 foreclose fees, trustee fees, inspection fees, and numerous other such fees.

2 263. Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants and HCLS acted intentionally and with the specific
3 intent of fixing the market, and inhibiting fair competition.

4 264. Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants and HCLS succeeded in inflating, fixing, and raising
5 real estate prices throughout the areas described, to the grave detriment of their consumers all of whom
6 were unknowingly forced to pay substantially more for their homes than they would have absent such
7 price/market fixing. Defendants' acts were the direct and proximate causes of Plaintiffs' harms.

8 265. As a result of such acts Plaintiffs have been damaged as set forth in Paragraph 237 (a)-(g)

9 266. Further, without limiting the damages as described elsewhere in this Complaint, Plaintiffs
10 damages arising from this Cause of Action also include loss of equity in their houses, costs and expenses
11 related to protecting themselves, reduced credit scores, unavailability of credit, increased costs of credit,
12 reduced availability of goods and services tied to credit ratings, increased costs of those services, as well
13 as fees and costs, including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and costs.

14 **COUNT 13: UNFAIR, UNLAWFUL, AND FRAUDULENT BUSINESS PRACTICES**

15 **(VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §17200)**

16 267. All preceding paragraphs and following paragraphs are hereby incorporated as though
17 fully set forth herein.

18 268. Specifically, each and every allegation of Count 9 (for violation of the UCL) arising
19 under the *previous* Cause of Action for Individual Appraisal Inflation, are set forth identically herein
20 and realleged here, in the interest of brevity. All of the wrongs and harms alleged in that Count are
21 specifically brought here in this Count as well.

22 269. In addition to the allegations of Count 9, Plaintiffs further allege as follows.

23 270. Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants and HCLS acts are additionally **fraudulent** as set
24 forth throughout this Third Cause of Action and the preceding Counts, all of which are hereby
25 incorporated by reference.

26 271. Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants and HCLS's acts are additionally **unfair** in that the
27 intentional systematic manipulation and inflation of real estate values throughout California, causing
28 Plaintiffs (and numerous others) to have to pay substantially more for their homes, loans, taxes, and

1 numerous other fees – all so that the Conspiracy of Defendants could profit is patently unfair.

2 272. Ally Defendants, Bank Defendants and HCLS acts are additionally **unlawful** in that

3 a. their market and price fixing activities constitute violation of Anti-Trust law under the
4 Sherman Act.

5 273. Further as a result of Defendant's (1) artificial and fraudulent inflation of Plaintiffs' property
6 values, and property values throughout the State of California, as well as (2) Defendants' abandonment of
7 their own as well as industry standard underwriting guidelines, coupled with (3) Defendants incentive to
8 package and sell as many dollars' worth of loans as they could to the secondary market, Defendants placed
9 Plaintiff-borrowers into loans which were considerably larger than were justified by (a) the *true* uninflated
10 valued of their properties, (b) Plaintiffs true uninflated incomes and (c) by Defendants own underwriting
11 guidelines. As a result of Plaintiffs were placed into larger loans than they could afford or should have been
12 placed into. The additional fees, points and interests paid as a result of the higher/inflated loan amounts
13 constitute damages, and legally cognizable sources of restitution.

14
15 **FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: DECEPTION IN LOAN MODIFICATIONS**

16 *(By Plaintiffs Norberto Flores-Zenteno, Margarita Flores-Zenteno, Robert Payne, Mary Serrano,*
17 *Terrance Hutchinson, Star Hutchinson, Gregory Calvillo, Marilyn Calvillo, David Dewayne Thomas,*
18 *Gilberto Pelayo, Carlos Orillosa and Carolina Sanots-Orillosa, Ana Casillas, Samuel Silva and*
19 *Carmen Silva – Against Bank Defendants and all other Defendants as Co-Conspirators)*

20
21 **Defendants' Scheme To Extract Workout Payments From Borrowers In Distress And Then**
22 **Foreclosing, As Opposed To Genuinely Offering Loan Modifications**

23 274. In the face of the escalating foreclosure crisis in the United States and especially in
24 California, Bank Defendants have further victimized and preyed on those struggling to keep by offering
25 and inducing customers into illusory "Workout Agreements," which purport to offer hope of an
26 opportunity to cure loan default, but in truth and fact are merely a ruse through which Bank Defendants
27 dupes homeowners into paying them thousands of dollars immediately before they foreclose. On
28 information and belief, Bank Defendants have reaped illicit profits from these actions exceeding \$100

1 million.

2 275. In their capacity as loan servicers, Bank Defendants are paid by and beholden to the
3 investors that hold the principal and interest rights to the loan being serviced. The larger the face value
4 of the pools of loan Bank Defendants service, the more it makes. Quality of servicing and
5 responsiveness to borrowers are irrelevant to the bottom line. In fact, for loans in default, past due, and/
6 or on the brink of foreclosure, Bank Defendants makes *more money* in fees. As such, it is in Bank
7 Defendants interest to have loans in default and arrears for as long as possible prior to foreclosure, then
8 foreclosing. Bank Defendants stand only to lose revenue by giving loan modifications to borrowers
9 instead of foreclosing.

10 276. Bank Defendants' servicing agreements with investors provide that the Bank Defendants
11 gets a set percentage of every dollar it collects from borrowers. If a borrower is in default and not
12 making any payments, Bank Defendants then receive no compensation for servicing the loan. In
13 addition, most of Bank Defendants' loan servicing agreements requires them to advance to investors the
14 monthly payments that defaulted borrowers do not make. This requires Bank Defendants to borrow
15 money from its parent bank to cover such advances. It is thus disastrous to Bank Defendants'
16 profitability to have defaulted loan where no payments are being made.

17 277. As a result, Bank Defendants designed the "Workout Agreements" at issue here to
18 convert non-performing loans that only cost it money into "cash-flowing" loans that made it money. Its
19 policies from the outset of its use of the Workout Agreements require any borrower asking for a
20 modification to first sign-up for a Workout Agreement, and it financially incentivized its call center
21 employees to push the Workout Agreements on all defaulted borrowers. It is in Aurora's interest to
22 delay – but not prevent- foreclosure when by doing so it can avoid making the payment advances to its
23 investors and collect additional sums from distressed borrowers prior to foreclosure.

24 278. Under California's non-judicial foreclosure rules, by electing to foreclose, a party loses
25 the right to collect any amount owed on the loan that exceeds the amount recovered through the
26 foreclosure process. Thus, when a home is worth less than the amount owed, after an election is made to
27 non-judicially foreclose on the borrower, that borrower does not have to repay any deficiency, and
28 Bank Defendants has no legal authority to collect, any arrearage or missed payments on the loan(s).

1 Importantly, once a foreclosure has been initiated, a borrower has no legal obligation to make payments
2 on the loan and the lender has no legal ability to collect any such payments.

3 279. These activities have been the subject of intense scrutiny, enforcement actions and
4 litigation. As recently as April 13, 2011, multiple Federal regulators entered into stipulated consent
5 orders with certain Defendants herein and related entities such as MERS (described below) describing
6 massive failures and taking the first steps toward requiring Defendants and other banks to refund sums
7 to homeowners improperly foreclosed upon by Defendants and other banks.

8 280. Some Plaintiffs entered into "Workout Agreements" with Bank Defendants in which
9 Plaintiffs promised to pay and paid thousands of dollars- including legal and other fees which were not
10 owed under their mortgages- on the seeming return promise of a review for a loan modification and an
11 opportunity to cure their default at the end of a review period. But Bank Defendants' promises in return
12 were empty: At the end of the Workout Agreements it told borrowers to continue to make monthly
13 payments as it "considered" modification. Then it foreclosed on Plaintiffs' homes *without allowing*
14 *borrowers access to any "cure method" despite its promises in the Workout Agreements to do so.*

15 281. In fact, Bank Defendants' internal policies and procedures were *not* to render a
16 modification decision during the term of the Workout Agreements and its policy was *not* to provide cure
17 information to the borrower at the end of the Workout Agreement absent a specific request from the
18 borrower. As a result, Bank Defendants fraudulently induced their customers to enter the Workout
19 Agreements and pay them thousands of dollars, while making no legally binding promise in return to
20 Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs in this action are entitled to rescind. In the alternative, Plaintiffs allege that
21 Aurora breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing when it foreclosed on Plaintiffs' homes without
22 first giving an opportunity to cure the default.

23 282. In return for Plaintiffs' promises to make monthly payments, under the "workout
24 agreements", which included legal and other fees not required to be paid under Plaintiffs' mortgages,
25 Bank Defendants promised: (a) not to foreclose for the duration of the Workout Agreement; and (b) at
26 the end of the Workout Agreements to provide an opportunity for Plaintiffs to "cure: their loan
27 deficiency through: (1) reinstatement (*i.e.*, bring the loan current); (2) payoff(*i.e.*, refinancing with
28 another lender to pay off the serviced loan); (3) modification at the discretion of Bank Defendants; or (4)

1 another workout "option" at the discretion of Bank Defendants.

2 283. The Workout Agreements signed and offered to Plaintiffs by Bank Defendants were a
3 sham. They were illusory because Bank Defendants made materially false statements in the Workout
4 Agreements and made no legally binding promises in exchange for the borrowers' promises to make
5 payments. The (1) loan modification and (2) "other" workout options were entirely at Bank Defendants'
6 discretion, and thus not a binding promise. The options to cure by (3) reinstatement or (4) payoff were
7 also illusory because Bank Defendants' policy was to foreclose on properties *without providing the*
8 *opportunity to cure* default through another means to avoid foreclosure. Borrowers had no opportunity
9 to cure through reinstatement or pay-off their loan because they were not told at least five days before
10 the Trustee's sale date that a modification other workout plan was denied. As a result, Plaintiffs' consent
11 to the Workout Agreements was fraudulently obtained and Bank Defendants' consideration for the
12 Workout Agreements failed, rendering such agreements *void ab initio* and subject to rescission. In
13 addition, under the black letter California law, Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages where, as here,
14 consent to a contract is fraudulently induced. *See Mahon v. Berg*, 267 Cal. App. 2d 588, 589 (1968).

15 284. Plaintiffs are entitled to rescind and obtain back from Bank Defendants their promised
16 (and delivered) consideration, namely the payments that were made to Aurora under the Workout
17 Agreements and Extended Workout Agreements. Because California law prohibits deficiency
18 judgments, Aurora was not entitled to require, post-election-to-sell payments and foreclose on the loans.
19 Nor were Plaintiffs required to make such payments. These payments were new consideration. Such
20 payments included legal and other fees which Plaintiffs had no obligation to pay under their mortgages
21 absent Bank Defendants' Work out Agreement Scheme.

22 285. In the alternative, should the Workout Agreements and/or Extended Workout
23 Agreements be deemed enforceable, Bank Defendants has breached its duty of good faith and fair
24 dealing by foreclosing on Plaintiffs' properties without providing the opportunity to cure the loan default
25 at least five days prior to the Trustee's sale. Plaintiffs complied with all of their obligations under the
26 Workout Agreements and Extended Workout Agreements. At the very least, Bank Defendants were
27 required by good faith and fair dealing to provide notice to Plaintiffs that had been rejected and that
28 Plaintiffs needed to invoke another of the permitted means to cure their defaults.

1 286. Irrespective of validity of the Workout Agreements and Extended Workout Agreements,
2 Bank Defendants has violated the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1788,
3 *et seq.*, by using false, deceptive and misleading statements in connection with their collection of
4 Plaintiffs' mortgage debt – namely the false promise of modification.

5 287. Through this Action, Plaintiffs seek to stop Bank Defendants from preying on their
6 customers through its Workout Agreement Scheme. Where Bank Defendants intend to foreclose on a
7 property, and after it has exercised its election to sell under non-judicial foreclosure, it must not be
8 permitted to extract thousands of dollars in additional payments with illusory promises and false
9 statements of opportunities to cure defaulted loans. Bank Defendants have sold or initiated foreclosures
10 on many of the Plaintiffs in this action. At the very least, Plaintiffs are entitled to a return of the
11 payments they made under the false promise from Bank Defendants that Plaintiffs would at least have an
12 opportunity to avoid foreclosure.

13 288. Once a lender invokes its power to sell the underlying security for a mortgage (through
14 providing its "Notice of Default and Election to Sell"), it cannot also seek to collect on the underlying
15 note any amount owed in excess of the amount it recovers through the trustee's sale.

16 a. California law forbids deficiency judgments in non-judicial foreclosure of residential
17 mortgages. *See* Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 580b. Once a lender invokes its power to sell the
18 underlying security for a mortgage (through providing its "Notice of Default and Election
19 to Sell"), it cannot also seek to collect on the underlying note any amount owed in excess
20 of the amount it recovers through the trustee's sale.

21 b. The notion that a mortgage lender must elect his remedy is also codified in the "Security
22 First Rule," Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 726. It provides that where Cal Code Civ. Proc. §
23 580b applies; an action in foreclosure is the *only* means by which a mortgagor can
24 forcibly collect on a note secured by a deed of trust.

25 289. California law provides that a Trustee's sale can be postponed by mutual agreement. *See*
26 Cal. Civ. Code § 2994g. However, the new date and time of the postponed sale must be provided by the
27 trustee (and can be "cried") at the time of the prior scheduled sale. *See* Cal. Civ. Code § 2994g (d).
28 Bank Defendants herein count on the crier rule in the design and implementation of its Workout

1 Agreement Scheme. It knows that borrowers will not be present at the first scheduled Trustee's sale
2 because it tells them that such sale is "suspended" or "on hold." Thus, it knows that Plaintiffs will have
3 no way to know whether a new date and time has been set for the foreclosure and will have to rely on
4 Aurora's assurances that such sales will not occur if Aurora's demands for payment are met.

5
6 **Bank Defendants' Adhesive Workout Agreements Are Unconscionable**

7 290. Plaintiffs have entered in Workout Agreements with Bank Defendants. The terms of
8 Bank Defendants' Workout Agreements are contained in a standard form, which is drafted by Bank
9 Defendants.

10 291. Moreover, Plaintiffs are not in a bargaining position with respect to the imposition of
11 Aurora's from Workout Agreement. Aurora is a large lender and loan servicer with substantial assets
12 and resources. Plaintiffs are individual homeowners under financial hardship and have substantially less
13 bargaining power.

14 292. Bank Defendants prepare the Workout Agreements and presents them to borrowers for
15 their signature.

16 293. Bank Defendants thus requires borrowers to agree to the Workout Agreement as
17 presented. It does not provide an opportunity to negotiate or opt-out of the unconscionable terms at issue
18 herein. The inequality of bargaining power this results in no real negotiation and absence of a
19 meaningful choice on the part of Plaintiffs.

20 294. Bank Defendants' form Workout Agreements contain multiple provisions that are
21 unfairly one-sided, overly harsh and punitive to borrowers, and thus substantively unconscionable.
22 Under the terms of the form Workout Agreement, Bank Defendants systematically (1) fail to withdraw
23 foreclosure proceedings against borrowers who are in "Workout Agreements" and who make payments
24 under the Workout Agreement; (2) create payment plans whereby the aggregate payments are
25 insufficient to cure the borrower's deficiency; and (3) initiate foreclosures with no notice and
26 opportunity for the borrower to cure any alleged default.

**Bank Defendants Fail To Withdraw Foreclosure Proceedings Even When Borrowers Have
Made All Plan Payments Under The Workout Agreement**

295. Bank Defendants' Workout Agreements purport to obtain the borrower's agreement that foreclosure proceedings commenced by Bank Defendants will not be withdrawn unless Bank Defendants determines to do so. In this regard, the Workout Agreement Provides:

Section 2.B. Except as set forth in Section 2.C. below, the Lender will suspend any scheduled foreclosure sale, provided I continue to meet the obligations under this Plan, but any pending foreclosure will not be dismissed and may be immediately resumed from the point at which it was suspended if this Plan terminates, and no new notice of default, notice of intent to accelerate, notice of acceleration, or similar notice will be necessary to continue the foreclosure action, all rights to such notices being hereby waived unless prohibited by law;

(See Exhibit "A" to Complaint, p.2)

296. Relying on the above provision, Bank Defendants fails to withdraw foreclosure proceedings while borrowers are supposedly being considered for a loan modification. Once borrowers begin making payments under the Workout Agreement, Bank Defendants unilaterally postpone any pending foreclosure sales date without obtaining the borrowers mutual consent and without informing borrowers of the reset foreclosure dates. It does so *even if* borrowers make all Plan Payments under the Workout Agreement.

297. Bank Defendants' policy of failing to withdraw foreclosure proceedings and resetting the foreclosure sale date without the mutual agreement of, or notice to, borrowers in unfair, unlawful, and injurious to such borrowers. This practice is calculated to ultimately allow Bank Defendants to foreclose without notice or an opportunity to cure after obtaining payments under the Workout Agreement.

298. After inducing Plaintiff Borrowers into entering dangerous loans through outright deception and in the name of greed - loans which would threaten their livelihoods - Defendants refused to modify Plaintiff Borrowers' loans despite laws and court orders which required them to make good faith efforts to do. Why? To protect themselves. Not the borrowers, but themselves. Because Defendants were required to buy back loans from their investors if a material misrepresentation was discovered, Bank Defendants refused to modify loans which qualified in every regard for one, for fear of having their own fraud and falsified information discovered by the investor, and having to buy back their

1 fraudulent loans, and incurring massive loss. In other words, Bank Defendants placed their fiscal
2 interests ahead of borrowers who desperately needed and *qualified* for the modifications, and who would
3 face financial ruin or homelessness without one. Instead, Defendants chose to line their coffers, rather
4 than offer assistance to the very people they imperiled through their greed – assistance they were under a
5 good faith obligation to provide. Simply put, Bank Defendants were looking out for themselves.

6 299. Plaintiffs believe and hereby allege that the servicers would want to use MERS to keep the
7 investor information private is to obscure truth from the Plaintiffs and the Certificate Holders of the Trust.

8 300. Every Pooling and Servicing Agreement has strict Warranties and Material
9 Misrepresentation Provisions that must be honored by the Depositors. In the event that a loan has a
10 material misrepresentation or violates the warranties given to certificate holders and the Trustee of the
11 REMIC, the loan must be purchased from the Certificate Holders and whatever insurance was in place is
12 now void due to fraud being detected on the loan.

13 301. In the case of loan modifications it benefits the servicer to keep vital information away
14 from the Certificate Holders and the Trustee that oversees the Trust. In the event that fraud is detected
15 on a mortgage loan the “**buy back**” provisions kick in and the servicer or originator, which is sometimes
16 the same company, would be forced to take back the loan. In this case Bank Defendants would be forced
17 to put a dead loan on their balance sheet with no hopes of being able to collect on the insurance policy
18 that is in place due to fraud.

19 302. When Plaintiffs are desperate for help, Bank Defendants refuses to assist them. In the
20 event that Bank Defendants forwards the true and accurate financial information to the Trustee
21 overseeing the REMIC or to a third party chosen by the Trustee, they can and sometimes do find
22 material misrepresentations that took place at origination. A Plaintiff supplies current financial
23 information up to and including a signed 4506-T and the investor or Aurora through their processing
24 centers find out that the income listed on the initial loan application was not correct.

25 303. This leads to a chain of events that Plaintiffs and the Courts are unaware of. Based on
26 evidence Plaintiffs will introduce at trial Bank Defendants instructs their employees to decline any
27 application to modify a loan that contains a material misrepresentation for *fear of having to buy back*
28 *the loan.*

1 304. This practice has led to numerous lawsuits including Government lawsuits in which
2 Government Sponsored Enterprises have independently sent out modification requests and have verified
3 fraudulent information was used at the origination of the Plaintiffs loans.

4 305. This practice alone has led to millions of American's losing their homes for fear of
5 reprisal from investors that were lied to, when they purchased these *Toxic* loans.
6 Defendants' wrongful acts continue to this day with hardball tactics and deception that continue to
7 threaten Plaintiffs' rights and financial security, as well as the economic future of the State of California.
8 Since 2010, these tactics and Defendants' other wrongful acts have been revealed as a result of extensive
9 litigation and Government investigations.

10
11 **Defendants Used The Promise Of Loan Modifications As Bait To Damage Plaintiffs' Credit,**
12 **Preventing Plaintiffs From Obtaining Financing Anywhere Else**

13 306. Bank Defendants had an unfair and fraudulent pattern on inducing and directing
14 borrowers to fall behind on their payments with the promise that by doing so, they would become
15 eligible for a loan modification. Relying on these representations, Plaintiffs fell behind on their loan
16 payments, but were never offered a loan modification.

17 307. In doing so, Plaintiffs' credit was substantially damaged, they suffered greatly diminished
18 access to credit and financing, and were penalized with fees, penalties and charges in addition to
19 becoming delinquent on their loan as recommended by the Bank.

20 308. By recommending that Plaintiffs fall behind, Bank Defendants effectively trapped
21 Plaintiffs into keeping their loan with Defendants, because no other institution would help Plaintiffs
22 after they became delinquent on their mortgage, or after their credit was destroyed.

23 309. At its most fundamental level, these sorts of unscrupulous business tactics, undermine
24 notions of fair play and good faith in business dealings, and jeopardize the consuming public.

25
26 **Defendants Used The Promise Of Loan Modifications As Bait For An Outright Cash-Grab With No**
27 **Intent To Ever Modify Plaintiffs**

28 310. Bank Defendants also had an unfair and fraudulent pattern of offering borrowers what